

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

**THE HISTORY OF  
NATIONALISM**

## CHAPTER 4

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# ANTI-WESTERN DOCTRINES OF NATIONALISM

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## INTRODUCTION

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CRITIQUES of 'the West' voiced by non-Western intellectuals and public leaders have attracted considerable interest in recent years.<sup>1</sup> This is taking place in a context in which we face on the one hand the acceleration of economic globalization and rates of migration, and on the other hand the growing trend towards national and other forms of cultural essentialism. A strong resurgence of nationalism can be observed, for instance, in East Asia and Latin America. In the West, Islamic fundamentalism is usually regarded as the most important (and most threatening) case of anti-Westernism. Radical Islamism is a highly modern ideology that defines itself against internationalism and secularism—including the institution of the secular nation state—in the Islamic world. The disquiet in the West about the supposed erosion of the nation state<sup>2</sup> and about the rise of radical ethno-nationalisms has to do with the fact that the conflicts and tensions linked to it are not only a problem of 'underdeveloped states', but take place in the heart of Europe. As Anthony Hopkins put it: '... the unpredicted appearance of a virulent strain of assertive ethnicity has engulfed not just very different and very distant peoples but also societies whose proximity to our own is sufficiently close to suggest, not just that the barbarians are inside the walls, but that we are the barbarians'.<sup>3</sup> Partha Chatterjee even suggests that:

nationalism is now viewed as a dark, elemental, unpredictable force of primordial nature threatening the orderly calm of civilized life. What had once been successfully relegated to the outer peripheries of the earth is now seen picking its way back

towards Europe, through the long-forgotten provinces of the Habsburg, the Czarist, and the Ottoman empires. Like drugs, terrorism, and illegal immigration, it is one more product of the Third World that the West dislikes but is powerless to prohibit.<sup>4</sup>

This chapter discusses the history (and historiography) of anti-Western doctrines of nationalism. It begins by focusing on the development of ideas about the 'West' within non-Western societies during the nineteenth century and outlines the growth of more critical and alternative discourses with the globalization of nationalism. Such debates were usually limited to small elites. The 'West' was not the only point of reference. For example, around 1900 Japan began to serve as a metaphor for Asian modernity for the Ottomans, Egyptians, and Indians. The ambiguities of non-Western nationalism will be considered in relation to Gandhi and Senghor, who both combined indigenous and Western ideas of nationalism in specific, complex ways. Some reflections on 'Western' readings of nationalism in the era of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, characterized by rather optimistic notions of nation-building, are followed by a final section on alternative ways of understanding the nationalism of this period, for instance, as in Bengal and in Tanzania, in terms of indigenous discourse and patterns of collective action.

## NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION, AND CRITIQUES OF 'THE WEST'

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The assumption that nationalism is a Western product and the question of what has been made of it in the non-Western world are familiar topics in academic as well as political discourses. For a long time, 'nationalism was generally considered as one of Europe's most magnificent gifts to the rest of the world'. Most historians of colonialism and area specialists agreed that nationalism was a European import: 'the debates in the 1960s and 1970s in the historiographies of Africa or India or Indonesia were about what had become of the idea and who was responsible for it'.<sup>5</sup> The rejection of 'Westernization' in the name of authentic cultural traditions was a common theme in much of this literature. Anti-Western ideas in the non-Western world have a long history, much of which is linked to nationalism. What was meant by 'the West', and what was criticized about it, varied considerably over time and space. In this context, the suggestive term 'Westernization' cannot really catch the complexity of mutual influence, hybridization, and cross-cultural entanglement that characterized the world in the era of imperialism and colonialism. Still, the idea that the non-Western world had to incorporate aspects central to European culture and its political order was shared by most elites outside Europe and the United States. While during the mid-nineteenth century, these elites could try to uphold the myth of cultural and political autonomy, things had changed around 1900. Western dominance and the imperialist grip on the world had conjoined local, regional, national, and international politics all over the world. Ideas and

concepts about the domestic order had become increasingly linked to ideas of the global order.<sup>6</sup>

Many concepts and institutions began to spread globally, 'nation' and 'nationalism' among them. The nationalization of the world in the nineteenth century did considerably affect the colonized and semi-colonized parts of the globe. One could argue that nationalism and colonialism were at once products and agents of a Eurocentric globalization. However, at first glance the emergence of the nation state in its territorial presuppositions seems to contradict the imperatives of globalization.<sup>7</sup> The various nationalist movements that mushroomed around 1900 in many non-European areas posed a serious challenge to the international order based on large overseas empires and international law. Outside the West, nationalism soon emerged as the leading ideology and privileged form of political discourse, and eroded more encompassing definitions of belonging in places as diverse as Egypt and India. In some regions, for instance Europe and Latin America, nationalism had a longer history dating back to before 1800. In other parts of the world, for example Japan and China, early formations of nationalism emerged during the first part of the nineteenth century. Nationalism was the product of a complex set of social conditions and political discourses within a society and its regional contexts. Besides these long-standing, more or less 'internal' traditions of nationalism, the fast-growing entanglement of the world since the late nineteenth century worked as an additional, 'external' factor that decisively influenced the trajectories of nationalism worldwide. The emergence of a world order of nation states went hand in hand with the spread of nationalism, and even in those societies in which the nation state looked back to a longer history, the discourse of nationalism was frequently shaped by the new waves of globalization.<sup>8</sup>

More recently, some historians have suggested 'that the nation-state itself was a product of the prior emergence of inter-state relationships, which more or less forced nationhood on a previously diverse set of political systems, ranging from the tribal to the imperial'.<sup>9</sup> The global spread of the nation state beginning in the mid-nineteenth century in turn shaped further the processes of globalization. On the one hand, juridical principles regulating both relationships between states and between states and their subjects were diffused globally. On the other hand, there were strong efforts to erase local differences and varieties within the nation in the name of national cultural homogeneity. Increases in global mobility especially shaped discourses of nationalism.<sup>10</sup> As the example of Chinese migration shows,<sup>11</sup> in the face of a growing number of migrants, around 1900 many countries strengthened their immigration controls and devised ways of enforcing control over the mobility of people, including passports, fingerprints, and other biometrical devices. The Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States in 1882 is such a case. Chinese mobility also contributed to the ethnicization of notions of national belonging. In essence, mass migration influenced and defined a sense of nation both for the host country and the country of origin. The existence of Chinese communities in places such as the United States prompted questions concerning the cohesion and composition of the nation and fed into discourses of nationalism. One could argue that 'the particular form that nationalism and

the representation of the nation-state took around the year 1900, were not mere invented traditions, but rather at least partly the effects of interactions and entanglements on a global scale'.

The spread of nationalism and the nation state was characterized by a striking ambiguity. On the one hand, it was part and parcel of the Westernization of the world; on the other hand it undermined a system of large Western overseas empires. Nationalism was often closely linked to anti-colonialism: local groups and individuals seeking power in a colonial state, aiming at the 'political kingdom' (Kwame Nkrumah). Anti-colonial nationalism was an important driving force of the decolonization process that shaped the mid-twentieth century.<sup>12</sup> An exception is Latin America, where some twenty states (except one: Cuba) have enjoyed formally independent existences since they emerged from the dissolving Spanish and Portuguese empires in the 1810s and 1820s. As such, they are even older than most European states. However, Frederick Cooper stresses the fact that it would be wrong to present nationalism as subsuming all other struggles in the period preceding national independence. Such a perspective, Cooper writes, does 'miss a lot of history, notably the tension—at times a creative one—between the national question and other sorts of social questions'.<sup>13</sup>

## ELITES, WESTERNIZATION, AND ANTI-WESTERN NATIONALISMS

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From the mid-nineteenth century the debates of cultural and political elites in China, Japan, India, Africa, and the Ottoman Empire often (though not exclusively) referred to 'Europe' and the 'West'. From the perspective of non-European observers, 'Europe' appeared more homogenous and consistent than as experienced from within. However, this image considerably contributed both to Europe's external effects and its identity.<sup>14</sup> The 'non-Western' preoccupation with the 'West' took various forms. In India the Brahmin prohibition against crossing the 'black waters' (*kala pani*) remained valid until the nineteenth century, and Gandhi was accused of breaking the taboo when he went to study in England. By contrast, in Japan coming to terms with the West had started in the pre-modern period in the form of 'Dutch studies' (*rangaku*). In specific schools, for a long time seen as subversive, texts in Western military, medical, and agrarian sciences were studied.<sup>15</sup>

'European studies' in the non-Western world and non-Western perspectives on Europe must be located within an asymmetrical world order characterized by colonial structures and a capitalist world economy. Here it is important to note that non-Western ideas about Europe cannot be reduced to purely negative criticism. Japanese and Ottoman elites strongly criticized the modern city, capitalism, and the 'Western spirit.' However, these critical views did not represent the whole spectrum of non-Western ideas about Europe. Moreover, the anti-Western views cannot be exclusively

traced back to the ideas of European romanticism. Neither should the agency of non-Western elites be reduced to the translation and cultural colouration of ideas that were 'born in Europe, before [they were] transferred to other parts of the world'.<sup>16</sup>

Non-European actors had various ways of selectively appropriating European 'achievements'. References to the 'West' were mainly restricted to educated groups and intellectual and political elites. Such elites pursued different goals, whether it be 'self-strengthening' (*yangwu* was the slogan in Qing China) in the face of colonial threat, or the effort to assert their own interests within their societies. The intensified preoccupation with the West was closely linked to the growth of exchanges transcending borders and the parallel formation of a global consciousness. Technological innovations, especially the 'information revolution' since the 1850s, were crucial here.<sup>17</sup> New public spheres emerged, especially in parts of Asia, Latin America, and the Ottoman Empire, which flourished in existing discussion fora.<sup>18</sup> The emergence of the press contributed to the spread of ideas and formed an important basis for coming to terms with the 'West'.<sup>19</sup>

Tapan Raychaudhuri has proposed a typology of the attitudes of intellectual elites in order to analyse the Indian 'xenology of Europe', which can roughly be applied elsewhere.<sup>20</sup> Raychaudhuri first identifies 'traditional elites', both Brahmin and Muslim, whose view of the world initially was hardly influenced by their encounter with the West. During the nineteenth century, this group declined relative to elites who were more influenced by the West. Most Indians who expressed their views in public, in principle came to agree with British politicians and Orientalists who regarded India as a backward society. Consequently many of them advocated firm reform politics: One interesting example was the group 'Young Bengal' led by the schoolteacher Henry Derozio, which called with great enthusiasm for the acceptance of Western customs, clothes, and eating habits, and made fun of the 'irrational character' of local customs. However, the modernizing impulse was usually linked to reservations about colonialism. Moreover, admiration for the West was seldom unqualified. Rammohan Roy (c.1770–1833), a pioneer of Indian modernity, argued for Indian wisdom and against increasingly hostile Evangelicals while also campaigning against Indian customs such as *sati* (suttee) and polygamy. He endorsed universalism and rationality and criticized irrational and non-universal aspects of Western culture.<sup>21</sup> Raychaudhuri stressed 'the well-known fact that the Indian national consciousness developed initially alongside a great enthusiasm for British rule in India. The colonial projection that the British conquest was the best thing that ever happened to India was widely accepted until the 1890s.'<sup>22</sup>

Members of the small group of mission-educated West Africans such as James Africanus Horton (1835–83) also called for British intervention. Horton, the son of a freed slave, had studied medicine in London and Edinburgh and returned to Sierra Leone as a military doctor and administrator. He considered himself a citizen and African, regarded Christianity as a civilizing force and European colonization as a means to found modern democracies and constitutional monarchies. For him, technology and schools were the most important instruments of progress. He saw

European colonization as a means to an end, a first step towards achieving independence as soon as possible. Horton repeatedly argued for the establishment of a University for West Africa that would demonstrate the intellectual equality of Africans to Europeans and help modernize Africa at technological, economic, and social levels. It was completely natural for Horton to take over ideas and institutions coming from Europe. At the same time he criticized those Europeans who promised 'civilization' but refused to provide Africans 'civilizing' institutions such as universities.<sup>23</sup>

Horton can be seen as a forerunner of Pan-Africanism. Edward Blyden (1832–1912) was an early key contributor to the ideologies of Pan-Africanism (and West African nationalism), articulating a notion of 'African personality' and the uniqueness of the 'African race'. Blyden constantly travelled back and forth across the Atlantic. From Sierra Leone, he travelled to England and encouraged both the Church Missionary Society and the British government to expand their activities into Sierra Leone's hinterland. He believed that the expansion of 'Christian civilization' throughout the region could create the basis for the emergence of a large and influential West African state. In *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race*, published in 1887, Blyden expressed the conviction that underlies later explicit formulations of Pan-Africanism: 'Among the conclusions to which study and research are conducting philosophers, none is clearer than this—that each of the races of mankind has a specific character and specific work.' Blyden argued explicitly that what he called Africa's current 'state of barbarism' did not reflect any innate deficiency in the 'Negro': 'There is not a single mental or moral deficiency now existing among Africans . . . to which we cannot find a parallel in the past history of Europe'.<sup>24</sup> Blyden's ideas became particularly influential amongst Western-educated West Africans. The Nigerian intelligentsia, for instance, adopted these ideas to defend itself.<sup>25</sup> The vague, unformed sense of being 'Black Englishmen' was displaced by a sense of being black, part of the rising community of diasporan Africans. The members of the educated community could become a genuine elite not by serving as agents of the Western penetration into the African darkness but by combining Western knowledge with their putative racial characteristics, acting in concert with black elites of similar mind. For West Africans this identity could assume many forms—they could see themselves as Yoruba, West Africans, Africans, or 'Negroes'—but in what has been called the 'cosmopolitan black ethos' of the period, all these identities were subsumed under their 'common historical and racial identity with the Negroes of Black America'.<sup>26</sup> Whatever Yoruba or West African qualities they held, were claimed as virtues of the race affirmed against claims of European hegemony and superiority. Similarly, accomplishments by any black—West African or not—were taken as evidence of ability that pertained to all. The intelligentsia adopted this racial community as their own in diverse contexts, in the pursuit of what Blyden termed 'race organisation and race consolidation'.<sup>27</sup> Accepting the premise of innate racial distinctions but proclaiming that African differences were not inferiorities, Blyden as well as members of the West African coastal elites sought to establish African standards of civilization by which European contributions might be judged valuable or not. The vision was that Africa would create a unique civilization on its own terms, learning

from the West but not betraying its racial existence. The 'inspiration of the race is in the race', Blyden argued. Each race had its own particular genius and future, and 'that only [sic] way must be found before there can be peace and harmony and progress'.<sup>28</sup>

In the course of the nineteenth century, there was a growing protest directed not against Western values and norms but rather specific Western practices such as British colonial rule in India. This critique was often based upon the assumptions of the European Enlightenment. It referred to the lack of political freedom and democracy, to Christian intolerance, aggressive nationalism, colonial rule, and, especially, the growing influence of racial discourses that put into question the emancipation promises of the Enlightenment. Ottoman and Japanese elites 'perceived the late nineteenth century European discourses on the yellow race, the Muslim world and Orientals, in connection with the predominant notions of Darwinism and other scientific paradigms, as a judgment that they could never perfectly fulfill all the required standards of civilization due to defects in the racial makeup, religious beliefs or cultural character'.<sup>29</sup> Many Western-educated elites in Japan and the Ottoman Empire became increasingly disillusioned and expressed a strong sense of being rejected by the European centres to which they looked for inspiration. However, Ottoman and Japanese writers often accepted at least partly Western ideas of 'race hierarchy', especially for the 'races' deemed below them. While European authors perceived emerging Islamic solidarity as xenophobic anti-Westernism, Muslim writers usually denied the existence of any reactionary alliance against the West or noted that it was the only way to overcome the unjust Eurocentric world order. More or less in parallel with this, East Asian intellectuals were increasingly emphasizing the conflict between 'the white and the yellow races'. A notion of a shared Asian-Eastern identity emerged. It was, however, not the legacy of common culture, history, or religion, but the geopolitics of Western imperialism that was shaping the imaginations of non-Western intellectuals to conceptualize an anti-Western alliance. In other words: anti-Western critiques emerged from an ongoing engagement of Asian thinkers with a global circulation of ideas and exemplified the global character of debates over modernity, culture, and nationalism. Asian critiques of the materialism of the modern West echoed ideas that were widespread at the time in the West itself, as were essentialist notions of a refined Asian 'spirituality' adopted by Asian thinkers in something like a 'reverse orientalism'.<sup>30</sup> In the field of international politics, Asian and Muslim critics of the West did not reject the universal standards of the Enlightenment; rather, they employed those standards to condemn the European powers of hypocrisy in violating, with their racist, exclusionary, and imperialist practices, the very ideals they claimed to uphold in their 'civilizing mission'.

Critique of the West on the basis of traditional values also gained importance. Preference for local customs and ways of living led to a rejection of Western consumerism, industrialization, and factory work, the mechanization of modern life, the apotheosis of the nation state and, above all, individualism that was interpreted as egoism. A specific dichotomy worked here: readiness to appropriate the practical abilities of Europeans went hand in hand with the conviction that Eastern civilizations, as

represented for instance by Rabindranath Tagore, were 'spiritually' superior to the West.<sup>31</sup> In Japan, many authors evoked the complementary relationship between Western techniques and Japanese 'spirit' (*wakon yōsai*).<sup>32</sup> Especially since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the rapid appropriation of science, empiricism, and technology was accompanied by references to 'traditional' values; these traditions, however, were often 'invented' or at least 'reconfigured'.<sup>33</sup>

Around 1900 these debates only engaged a small part of the population. Beyond urban centres, there was barely any idea about 'the West'; furthermore, debates in India or Japan were much more intense than in Africa. Moreover, 'the West' was not the only point of reference for the elites. In China, reformist circles regarded Japan as a model for aspirations to modernization. Japan began also to serve as a metaphor for Asian modernity for the Ottomans, Egyptians, and Indians. The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 was a turning point in the history of anti-Western critiques. The contradictions of the legitimacy structures of the international order became more obvious. Anti-colonial nationalists and intellectuals in Asia, as well as in other parts of the world, used the Japanese victory to counter earlier discourses of white-race supremacy and the backwardness of the non-Western world. Nationalist movements all over Asia embraced the anti-Western internationalism of Pan-Asian and Pan-Islamic thought as a potential form of empowerment in their demands for autonomy and equality in the international order.

## THE AMBIGUITIES OF NON-WESTERN NATIONALISM: GANDHI AND SENGHOR

Nationalism in the non-Western world cannot be reduced either to anti-Western doctrines based on traditional values or the simple appropriation of Western models. There are numerous nuances of this position. Prasenjit Duara stresses the fact that nationalists in the colonies and semi-colonized regions like China usually posited an alleged ancient unity of the nation which granted them and the nation state the right to make a number of transformations. He does not deny indigenous foundations of nationalism, but argues that nationalists outside the West adapted the evolutionary assumptions of their colonial masters. Nationalist historians located their interpretations of the local pasts within an evolutionary paradigm framed around the argument that all developments inevitably led to modern capitalism and nationalism.<sup>34</sup> Christopher Bayly takes a different perspective. He identifies patriotism as the central concept of India's regional and pan-Indian nationalist movements that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. According to Bayly's definition, patriotism entails attachment, ideologies, and theories of government that engaged the rulers and populations of the regional homeland before and during the early phase of colonial rule. He suggests that traditions of remembered patriotism during this period formed the basis of the ideas

and institutions of later Indian nationalism.<sup>35</sup> The positions of Duara and Bayly represent interesting, but not incompatible, contrasts. While the first tends to the 'invention of tradition' approach, the latter focuses less on discourse than collective action responses to colonialism, seeing later nationalism as based on earlier patriotism.

Two individual cases can serve to further illustrate the ambiguities of non-Western nationalism. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) is one of the most written-about personalities in modern history; his advocacy of non-violent action and his pioneering techniques of non-violent resistance and mass civil disobedience resonate in many parts of the world. Gandhi's reputation as the 'father' or 'maker' of independence was generally accepted during the later stages of the Indian nationalist movement, and in India and elsewhere since independence. He was credited with providing India's nationalist movement with a mass base, which essentially consisted of peasants. More recent historiography, however, argues that not all of Gandhi's ideas and activities promoted national unity or advanced the cause of national independence. 'In a nationalist movement spread over many decades and involving a variety of different personalities and approaches, including constitutionalism, terrorism and mass protest, Gandhi and his political techniques can hardly be credited with having had more than a partial share in wresting India's independence from the British.'<sup>36</sup> Thus the related debate focuses on two different questions: how far did Gandhi inhibit the nationalist cause, and how far did other factors advance it?

What is relevant here is the extent to which Gandhi's nationalist views and practices can be labeled anti-Western and how much he referred to local political traditions. At first glance, much of his nationalism seemed to be shaped by a substantial critique of the West or at least Britain. In his book *Hind Swaraj* (the Freedom of India), published in 1909, Gandhi offered a negative assessment not only of British rule in India but more generally of modern industrial civilization and the Western concept of civil society.<sup>37</sup> 'India's salvation,' he wrote, 'consists in unlearning what she has learnt during the past fifty years or so. The railways, telegraphs, hospitals, lawyers, doctors and such like have all to go, and the so-called upper class have to learn to live consciously and religiously and deliberately the simple life of a peasant.' Western representative institutions did not make much sense to him. He even compared Parliament with 'a sterile woman and a prostitute', because according to him this institution could never enact a law according to its own judgement and shifted its allegiance from one set of ministers to another, depending on which set happened to be more successful. Instead Gandhi's model for India was the Ram Rajya (the Kingdom of Rama) of the Hindu epic *Ramayana*. Ram Rajya was a patriarchy in which the ruler, the embodiment of moral virtue, always gave voice to the collective will. David Arnold aptly summarizes 'Hind Swaraj' as 'an odd (even eccentric) combination of Victorian anti-industrialism and Indian tradition (the latter in turn filtered through Western writers like Maine), which repeatedly castigates the dark side of modern civilization but sees none of its cultural or material benefits. Nor does it recognize the oppression and inequality, the violence and intolerance, the poverty, ignorance and disease, also to be found in pre-modern societies.'<sup>38</sup>

Gandhi's thinking has been described, among other things, as a 'reinvented discourse created out of modernity and influenced by the thinking of the colonial world'. There are many aspects in Gandhi's writings that refer to well-known Western classics of moral rearmament and social idealism. He created something like a counter-eugenicist language which inverted that of the pre-war nationalist leadership: we Indians are better fitted for the war of all nations against all, because our character and substance is not polluted with violence, lust, and love of pleasure. However, when he talked of communities as moralized networks of giving and receiving or the charisma of land, Gandhi also drew from a continuing indigenous tradition of political and moral philosophy that provided a hermeneutic link for the more abstract sense of nation.<sup>39</sup>

Léopold Sédar Senghor (1906–2001), who later became the first president of independent Senegal, was the main protagonist of the doctrine of Négritude. Négritude was a cultural project that emerged through intense discussions and intimate friendships among a diasporic peer group based in Paris whose members shared similar colonial backgrounds and metropolitan challenges, as well as an interest in Africa.<sup>40</sup> Senghor was a product of colonial assimilation. Before leaving home to join the transnational group of colonial students and activists living in continental France in the 1930s, he was trained in an overseas French school in Senegal to become a member of the native elite at home. Négritude in the 1930s was not a self-consciously organized movement. It consisted primarily of 'interminable discussions' among students who shared ideas, explored Paris, and began to write poetry. Senghor engaged contemporary currents of colonial thought, French culture, and black politics in order to fashion relationships to the colonial system in which he had been trained, to the French nation in which he now lived, and to the African societies to which he felt deeply connected. Over the course of his public life, Senghor would develop a complex conception of racial consciousness and cultural nationalism, but he would always argue that Négritude was a rejection of assimilation, the identification with blackness, and a celebration of African civilization that was conceptualized as a distinctive culture.

A good example of Senghor's ambivalent position is his attitude toward language. Senghor, who in his later life was the first African to be elected member of the prestigious Académie Française, often praised the French language for being, among other things, a highly poetic language. 'French prose,' he wrote, 'has taught us to rely on facts and ideas to clarify the universe in order to express the inner world through a coherent re-structuring of the universe.'<sup>41</sup> Yet he insisted that 'every African should be able to read and write in his own language' and that this 'is a sine qua non of the harmonious development of Black African society'.<sup>42</sup> While Senghor argued for cultural syncretism, he also attempted to construct Négritude as something that separates the African spirit from the Western one: 'L'émotion est nègre comme la raison est hellène.' Senghor's ideas about Africa were deeply shaped by European writings on Africa—namely the works of Leo Frobenius and Maurice Delafosse as well as the thoughts of the French colonial administrator Robert Delavignette. During the 1950s, as Senegalese representative in the French National Assembly, Senghor was one of the most effective African nationalists who harshly criticized French colonial politics and

helped to get new labour laws for Africa through Parliament. The central vision behind the reflections and activities of Senghor was to unify and integrate peoples of African descent all over the world and to challenge Western superiority. He combined a critique of Western politics and culture with a modernization project that—although conceptualized as an alternative modernity—included many elements of Western ideas and concepts.

It would be wrong, however, to conceptualize the indigenous traditions evoked by Gandhi and Senghor simply as non-Western variants on a common Western trope of anti-modernism, or to limit the analysis to the 'deconstruction' of these men's explicit insistence that their ideas are indigenously rooted. Senghor, for instance, could be described as a cultural broker and a good example for Frederick Cooper's observation that 'in between is as much a place to be home as any other'.<sup>43</sup> His specific position enabled Senghor to play with different cultural registers and repertoires. From that resulted a specific understanding of authority, power, culture and, for that matter, nationalism, which was neither traditional nor modern, neither Western nor anti-Western, but rather a specific *bricolage*.

## ACCOUNTS OF NATIONALISM IN THE NON-WESTERN WORLD AFTER WORLD WAR II: THE EXAMPLE OF AFRICA

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As Christopher Bayly rightly emphasized, it was 'in all former European colonies [that] intellectual elites have sought in history a body of myths of origin to legitimate their independence. This has been the most powerful influence on the development of post-colonial historiography.'<sup>44</sup> Since the rise of non-European historiography after World War II, nationalism ranks high among the central concerns of historians of and in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. The interest in nationalism and related historiographical debates has undergone various conjunctures and differed from region to region. The idea of nationalism as an exclusively Western export and the opposite concept of an authentically African, Chinese, or Indian nationalism largely untouched by Western influence represent the extreme poles of a discussion that has been shaped by many paradigms. Most of the earlier accounts of nationalism in the non-Western world followed an approach that stressed the central role of Western-educated elites for which nationalism represented an important tool to mobilize resistance to colonial rule. In other words: the degree of Westernization determined the power of the nationalist project. In the context of African history James S. Coleman's *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley 1958) provides a good example of this trend. To Coleman, 'modern' nationalism of the 1940s and 1950s, which he distinguished sharply from earlier revolts against colonialism (labelled 'traditional

nationalism'), implied sentiments, activities, and organizations that explicitly aimed at taking over the government and at achieving independence in a nation state. According to Coleman, the main characteristics of nationalism were: a) the explicit goal of self-government; b) the concept of a national unity; c) the dominance of a Western-educated elite in political decision-making; d) the formation of permanent political associations and parties to pursue national ideas and aims; and e) the dominance of 'modern' (= Western) political values.

This approach was directed against widespread judgements that the principle of national self-determination was not applicable to the cultural realities of non-Western areas. Arnold Toynbee argued in 1953, building partly on one of his older arguments:

During the last century and a half we have seen our Late Modern Western political institution of 'national states' burst the bounds of its birthplace in Western Europe and blaze a trail of persecution, eviction, and massacre as it had spread abroad into Eastern Europe, South-West Asia, and India—all of them regions where 'national states' were not part and parcel of an indigenous social system but were an exotic institution which was deliberately imported from the West, not because it had been found by experimentation to be suitable to the local conditions of these non-Western worlds, but simply because the West's political power had given the West's political institutions an irrational yet irresistible prestige in non-Western eyes.<sup>45</sup>

Against this view, African nationalists and nationalist historians could soon develop a general narrative of nationalist triumph.<sup>46</sup> One important form of this narrative focused on the issue of social mobilization and highlighted the ways in which the Western-educated elites were able to use the institutions and symbols of the colonial state for their own purpose, to mobilize the masses, and to instil a sense of national identity in the people of each African colony. The other crucial version of the nationalist narrative was the revolutionary one, represented most powerfully by Frantz Fanon, who denounced the anti-colonial nationalism of the Western-educated intellectuals or 'bourgeois nationalists' as 'false'. Fanon hoped for the revolutionary dynamic of peasants and the lumpenproletariat to overthrow the colonial regime with violence.<sup>47</sup>

Most members of the African elites espoused European ideas of progress and development. One important project of these elites was the creation of 'another' Africa, using science and technology. Oriented towards Western concepts of democracy, political organization, national self-determination, and economic growth, they set as their goals the ending of colonial rule and the creation of nation states. Aside from the dominant criticism of colonial politics, the political program of the nationalist elites fell back upon the heritage of African culture. Partly as a reaction to the European denial that there was any African history worth knowing, the Westernized elite has developed a high esteem of African culture and its past. In the view of the nationalist elite, the positive and usable elements of this culture and history were necessary to build up the new African nations.<sup>48</sup> However, the nationalist perspective implied crucial aspects of

the colonial discourse, for instance the sharp divide between pre-colonial and colonial cultures or the representation of peasants as backward people. The past was identified with prominent leaders, usually the founders and heads of African states. The bottom line was struggle over the control of modern institutions such as churches, professions, and ultimately government posts, and finally the tracing of a genealogy of nationalism. Within the nationalist-modernization ethos, it was state-formation that received the greatest attention. The terms in which political events of the past were presented tended to be those that most closely resembled the political systems of the present. 'In short, an indigenous past, with its own social forms and mythological values often very different from those in Europe was now being remythologized to fit an alien model and one which was not even working very well in contemporary Africa.'<sup>49</sup> The unitary nation state became the favoured child of both modernizers and socialists. Frantz Fanon even called for the 'liquidation' of all tribalisms and regionalisms, because otherwise the unity of the people would remain a chimera. For African nationalists of the 1950s and 1960s, 'Europe' and the 'West' were important points of reference. However, both in Africa and in India, there were alternative ways of understanding nationalism, for example in terms of indigenous discourses and patterns of collective action.

## NATIONALISM BEYOND WESTERNIZED ELITES

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In the case of South Asia, various scholars have argued that there was nothing like a local 'proto-nationalism', but that the Indian national leadership was totally appropriated by the discourse of power of the Western nation state.<sup>50</sup> Partha Chatterjee stresses that nationalism is a 'derivative discourse' in the colonial world, a discourse that originates in Europe.<sup>51</sup> He points to a basic contradiction, at the discursive level, within the nationalist discourse. On the one hand, he argues, this discourse was universal, because it posited the basic equality of all peoples in the world. On the other hand, at the level of its ethical and epistemological framework of knowledge, nationalist discourse was restricted to the patterns of Western thought, with its colonial constructions of Reason and Other, West and East. The contradiction between 'universal' and 'Eurocentric' became, according to Chatterjee, an important source of tension and dynamism in how nationalist discourses and movements were constructed in history. It led to important limits on what was even considered possible within nationalist politics. Chatterjee's main project seemed to be the demystification of famous nationalists such as Gandhi and Nehru. He tells the story of a kind of 'autonomous' or 'pure popular culture' that was betrayed by unscrupulous or tortured nationalist allies keen on building a new hegemony. Chatterjee later argued that 'religion' and the 'domestic sphere' served as pristine redoubts from which Indians could fight back against the colonial state and Westernization. Reacting largely to Benedict Anderson and a perception of the literature on nationalism as Eurocentric, Chatterjee attempts to

demonstrate that nationalism in Bengal and India was not constructed according to a European model or even in direct reaction to a European model. He claims that cultural national identity in these places pre-dated any nationalist political action directed against the imperialist powers. Instead, cultural identity was divided into spiritual and material realms. According to Chatterjee, the material identity was largely determined in relationship with colonial powers and it has been mistaken by many as the dominant strain of national identity. Much more crucial, in his view, was the spiritual area that was comprised of cultural content and was completely separate from any discourse with the colonizers. This spiritual identity provided the building blocks for later nationalist movements. Thus for Chatterjee there seem to be two kinds of nationalism: derivative and authentic. But how to explain why the domestic sphere and religion were less affected by colonialism and Western thoughts and practices than other aspects of Indian life and society?

Some historians have focused on forms of radical nationalist ideology in India, which seemed more suited to the country's social complexity than the derivative discourse of Western nationalism. A number of nationalists, for instance, propagated an idea of nation that stressed the nurturing aspect of nation rather than its rational ordering aspect. In Bengal around 1900, nationalism—neither 'dominated' nor 'derivative'—was apparently legitimized in terms of female virtue and power: 'Nationalist thought, even at the moment of departure, may well have found idioms of articulation that overlapped with European forms and yet at the same time opposed both the problematic and the thematic of colonial knowledge.'<sup>52</sup> Swadeshi songs, which were performed by singers in small towns and the countryside during the political upsurge after the partition of Bengal in 1905, referred to the affective relations created by the surviving routines of exchange and interdependence in rural Bengal. The songs underlined the force of the idea that people should buy the produce of local looms and other artisan products. Thus one element of nationalist ideology and action at the turn of the twentieth century—the support of the local textile production against imports from Manchester—was firmly rooted in Bengali society. As Christopher Bayly suggests, it drew not on invented traditions but on old ones, and thus stood for the ability to adapt genuine traditions to modern circumstances.<sup>53</sup>

In Africa, much anti-colonial opposition was inspired, organized, and directed by peasants. There were broad-based radical movements, national in scope, anti-colonial in focus, in which peasants played an essential, if not a determinant, role. Such movements, of course, contained ambiguities and contradictions, and were often themselves terrains of struggle.<sup>54</sup> In Tanzania, in the period of transition to independence, 'peasant intellectuals' who had articulated rural discourses on healing the land, anti-slavery, and democracy, became active and dynamic partners in the formation of a nationalist coalition. Some of the rural discourses, such as healing the land, were old but constantly reorganized at moments of political transition. Other discourses, for instance on anti-slavery and democracy, were products of the colonial period. Taken together, reorganized and modified by peasant intellectuals, these discourses became regional emancipatory ones and formed a dynamic core element of the Tanzanian

nationalist movement. However, peasant leaders did not possess the bureaucratic skills to position themselves strategically during the final scramble for state power. Thus it was the small educated elite working for the colonial administration, not the peasants, who came to power when independence was achieved in 1961.<sup>55</sup>

Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania and a former teacher, represented this tiny group of African bureaucrats taking over state power from their colonial predecessors. In the 1960s and 1970s, Nyerere acquired an international reputation for propagating an African socialism opposing Western values:

It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man. We, in Africa, have no more need of being 'converted' to socialism than we have of being 'taught' democracy. Both are rooted in our own past... Modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of 'society' as extension of the basic family unit. But it can no longer confine the idea of the social family within the limits of the tribe, nor, indeed, of the nation... Our recognition of the family to which we all belong must be extended yet further—beyond the tribe, the community, the nation, or even the continent—to embrace the whole of mankind.<sup>56</sup>

However, as so often with non-Western nationalist concepts, Nyerere's African socialism, too, was only at first glance an anti-Western doctrine, but also contained many elements of concepts deriving from the West.

## CONCLUSION

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This chapter has highlighted some aspects of the complex history of anti-Western doctrines of nationalism since the nineteenth century. It argued that anti-Western ideas in regions outside Europe and the United States have a long history that is often linked to issues of nationalism. However, what was meant by the 'West', and criticized about it, varied a lot. Moreover, for a long time debates about the 'West' only concerned small groups of non-Western intellectual elites. Gandhi and Senghor represent two examples for the main argument of this chapter, that nationalism in the non-Western world cannot be reduced either to anti-Western doctrines based on 'traditional' values or the simple appropriation of Western models. Both men combined in their ideas about nationalism a critique of the West based on references to the value of indigenous traditions with many Western concepts. Thus their specific understanding of nationalism was neither traditional nor modern, neither Western nor anti-Western, but a kind of bricolage and an ongoing effort to negotiate what is 'traditional' and what is 'modern', what is 'indigenous' and what is 'foreign', and what is 'right' and what is 'wrong'. However, an account on non-Western doctrines of nationalism should extend

beyond elites. Peasants in Asia and Africa have also shaped the ways in which nationalism was conceptualized and organized. The current wave of an apparently anti-Western nationalism voiced by intellectuals and political leaders in many non-European regions exhibits once more the ambiguities of non-Western nationalism.

## NOTES

1. A widely discussed but largely unsuccessful attempt to understand the rise of anti-Westernism is I. Buruma and A. Margalit (2004) *Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism*, New York. On this book, see also below.
2. A number of authors find arguments about the radical decline of the nation state exaggerated: see A. Ong (1999) *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*, Durham and London; F. Cooper (2001) 'What Is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian's Perspective', in *African Affairs*, 100, no. 399, 189–213.
3. A. G. Hopkins (1999) 'Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History', in *Past and Present*, no. 164, 201–2.
4. P. Chatterjee (1993) *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*, Princeton, NJ, 4.
5. Both quotes, Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments*, 4.
6. See S. Conrad and D. Sachsenmeier (eds.) (2007) 'Introduction', *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s*, New York, 6.
7. See A. Dirlik (2006) 'Globalization Now and Then: Some Thoughts on Contemporary Readings of Late 19th/Early 20th Century Responses to Modernity', *Journal of Modern European History*, 4, no. 2, 141.
8. Two recent global histories of the long nineteenth century see nationalism as one of its most important features, especially during the later part of this era. See C. A. Bayly (2004) *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*, Oxford, esp. ch. 6; J. Osterhammel (2009) *Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Munich, esp. ch. 8.
9. Dirlik, 'Globalization Now and Then', 141. One impressive example of this historiography is S. Conrad (2010) *Globalization and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, Cambridge.
10. A. McKeown (2004) 'Global Migration, 1846–1940', *Journal of World History*, 15, no. 2, 155–90.
11. The following paragraph relies on S. Conrad and K. Mühlhahn, 'Global Mobility and Nationalism: Chinese Migration and the Reterritorialization of Belonging, 1880–1910', in Conrad and Sachsenmeier, *Competing Visions*, 181–211 (quote: 204).
12. D. Rothermund (2006) *The Routledge Companion to Decolonization*, London and New York.
13. F. Cooper (1996) *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa*, Cambridge, 7.
14. S. Conrad (2006) "'Europa' aus der Sicht nicht-westlicher Eliten, 1900–1930", in *Journal of Modern European History*, 4, no. 2, 159.
15. See G. K. Goodman (2000) *Japan and the Dutch, 1600–1853*, Richmond, VA.
16. These are the arguments of Buruma and Margalit, *Occidentalism* (quote: 6).

17. See D. Headrick (1998) *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1840–1914*, New York, and (1991) *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1914*, Oxford.
18. See, for South Asia, the groundbreaking study by C. Bayly (1996) *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870*, Cambridge.
19. For the case of China, see B. Mittler (2004) *A Newspaper for China? Power, Identity, and Change in Shanghai's New Media, 1871–1912*, Cambridge, MA; R. G. Wagner (ed.) (2007) *Joining the Global Public: World, Image, and City in Early Chinese Newspapers, 1870–1910*, Albany, NY.
20. T. Raychaudhuri (1999) *Perception, Emotions, Sensibilities: Essays on India's Colonial and Post-colonial Experiences*, New Delhi. See also Conrad, 'Europa', 163–5.
21. See P. Robb (2002) *A History of India*, Basingstoke, 223.
22. Raychaudhuri, *Perception*, 19.
23. See C. Fyfe (1972) *Africanus Horton 1835–1883: West African Scientist and Patriot*, New York. Horton's most important publications were 'Political Economy of British West Africa' (London, 1865) and 'West Africa Countries and Peoples' (London, 1868).
24. E. W. Blyden (1887, repr. 1967) *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race*, Edinburgh, 140.
25. The following paragraph is based on P. S. Zachernuk (2000) *Colonial Subjects: An African Intelligentsia and Atlantic Ideas*, Charlottesville, VA. For the general context, see R. Rathbone, 'West Africa: Modernity and Modernization', in J.-G. Deutsch et al. (eds.) (2002) *African Modernities: Entangled Meanings in Current Debates*, Oxford, 18–30.
26. M. J. Echeruo (1978) *Victorian Lagos: Aspects of Nineteenth-Century Lagos Life*, London, 109.
27. Blyden, *Christianity*, 140. Zachernuk, *Colonial Subjects*, 67ff, and (2001) 'Critical Agents: Colonial Nigerian Intellectuals and their British Counterparts', in C. Youé and T. Stapleton (eds.) *Agency and Action in Colonial Africa*, New York, 156–71.
28. First quote from E. W. Blyden (1890) *The African Problem and the Method of its Solution*, second quote from Blyden (1908) *African Life and Customs*, both quoted by Zachernuk, *Colonial Subjects*, 70ff.
29. C. Aydin (2006) 'Beyond Civilization: Pan-Islamism, Pan-Asianism and the Revolt against the West', *Journal of Modern European History* 4, no. 2, 207. For the following paragraphs, see Aydin, 'Beyond Civilization'; (2007) *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*, New York, chs. 1 and 3; as well as Chapter 34 in this volume.
30. Aydin, 'Politics of Anti-Westernism', 89, 203.
31. See U. das Gupta (2004) *Rabindranath Tagore: A Biography*, Oxford.
32. See Conrad, 'Europa', 164.
33. Since E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.) (1983) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, it became—at least in the context of African history—nearly common sense that most traditions in Africa were 'invented' or 'imagined'.
34. P. Duara (ed.) (2004) *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then*, London; and (1997) *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, Chicago.
35. C. A. Bayly (1998) *Origins of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India*, New Delhi.
36. D. Arnold (2001) *Gandhi*, Harlow, 8.

37. For this and the following paragraphs (incl. the quotes from Gandhi), see S. Bose and A. Jalal (1998) *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy*, London and New York, ch. 13; Arnold, *Gandhi*, 64ff.
38. Arnold, *Gandhi*, 70.
39. Bayly, *Origins of Nationality*, 120ff (quote: 121).
40. There is a vast literature on Négritude. One of the more recent publication is G. Wilder (2005) *The French Imperial Nation-State: Négritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars*, Chicago and London. For the following paragraph, see esp. 151-7. An excellent biography of Senghor is J. G. Vaillant (1990) *Black, French, and African: A Life of Léopold Sédar Senghor*, Cambridge, MA.
41. Léopold Sédar Senghor (1979) 'French—Language of Culture', in J. A. Langley (ed.) *Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa 1856-1970: Documents on Modern African Political Thought from Colonial Times to the Present*, London, 381-2.
42. Léopold Sédar Senghor, 'The Problems of African Language', in Langley (ed.) *Ideologies of Liberation*, 374-6.
43. F. Cooper (1994) 'Conflict and Connection" Rethinking African Colonial History', *American Historical Review*, 99, 1539.
44. C. Bayly, 'Modern Indian Historiography', in M. Bentley (ed.) (1997) *Companion to Historiography*, London and New York, 677.
45. A. Toynbee (1953) *The World and the West*, New York and Oxford, 70-1.
46. For the following paragraph, see Cooper, *Decolonization*, 6-7.
47. F. Fanon [1961] (1966) *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York.
48. See for instance A. A. Mazrui and M. Tidy (1984) *Nationalism and New States in Africa*, Nairobi.
49. R. A. Austen (1993) "'Africanist' Historiography and its Critics: Can There Be an Autonomous African History?", in T. Falola (ed.) *African Historiography: Essays in Honour of Jacob Ade Ajayi*, Harlow, 207.
50. See P. Chatterjee (1986) *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, London; A. Nandy (1984) *The Illegitimacy of Nationalism*, Delhi.
51. For the following, see F. E. Mallon (1993) 'Dialogues Among the Fragments: Retrospect and Prospect', in F. Cooper et al. (eds.) *Confronting Historical Paradigms: Peasants, Labor, and the Capitalist World System in Africa and Latin America*, Madison, WI, 390ff.
52. See S. Bose (1997) 'Nation as Mother: Representations and Contestations of "India" in Bengali Literature and Culture', in S. Bose and A. Jalal (eds.) *Nationalism, Democracy, and Development: State and Politics in India*, Delhi, 50-76 (quote: 60); Bayly, *Origins of Nationality*, 117f.
53. Bayly, *Origins of Nationality*, 118.
54. See A. Isaacman (1990) 'Peasants and Rural Social Protest in Africa', *African Studies Review*, 33, 1-120.
55. S. Feierman (1990) *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania*, Madison, WI; Feierman's main argument is aptly summarized by Mallon, 'Dialogues', 391. My account follows her summary.
56. J. Nyerere (ed.) (1966) 'Ujamaa: The Basis of African Nationalism', *Freedom and Unity/Uhuru na Umoja: A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952-65*, Dar es Salaam.

colonialism, and the history of science. His publications include a monograph on "Ective Affinities: Racial Discourse and Nationalism in the Late 19th Century" (in German, 2004).

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s–1930s

*Sebastian Conrad and Dominic Sachsenmaier*

**D**uring the past two decades the discussions on world order have taken interesting turns. The collapse of the cold war constellation gave neoliberal visions of accelerating economic integration and global democratization a certain prominence within academic circles and a wider public sphere. For many observers the fall of the Berlin Wall and the removal of the iron curtain signified a future with the potential to grow into an era characterized by free trade, migration, and an ever-more tightly knit web of human interaction. Many deemed ideological fault lines and geopolitical rivalries to be outdated by the potentials that a new era of globalization brought to the international community. It was this optimistic branch of the late 1980s and early 1990s that brought widespread public attention to new programmatic terms ranging from "global village" to the "end of history" first and foremost in the United States but also in other parts of the world.<sup>1</sup> At that time a majority of Chinese intellectuals, for example, supported a new "Enlightenment" effort, widespread Westernization and internationalization programs for their society.<sup>2</sup> And in most countries of the former Warsaw Pact, liberal democratic parties won national elections—public endorsements to bring their societies closer to a more Western and more global world.<sup>3</sup> This mood has changed. The confidence in the possibilities of a world order centered on the Washington consensus and the logics of international

trade has experienced a massive loss of support. It has become evident that increasing entanglement does not automatically produce an open world society but, quite to the contrary, may generate antipathy and exclusionism. Consequently, globalization has come to stand not only for sympathy and integration but also for cacophony and polarization. Indeed, recent developments seem to suggest growing political disintegration and a declining world order, at a time when economic globalization and rates of migration continue to accelerate. Signs of centrifugal global forces are manifold. The political culture of the United States has become increasingly parochial in recent years, and, at least for the time being, national self-interest has replaced global commitment as the lead paradigm of American foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> A strong resurgence of nationalism in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe has proven the earlier optimism about a flourishing international community to be rather short-lived.<sup>5</sup> In many parts of the world, organized religious movements fed by widespread fear of globalization and its discontents are gaining political influence. Most notably, this is the case with Islamic fundamentalism, a highly modern ideology that defines itself against internationalism and secularism—including the institution of the secular nation-state in the Islamic World.<sup>6</sup> Political aspirations coming out of right-wing religious movements can also be observed in India,<sup>7</sup> or in the case of the rising influence of certain evangelical movements in the United States.<sup>8</sup>

The growing trend toward national, respectively cultural essentialism is related to the sustained processes of economic globalization that continue to characterize our time. Despite the Asian economic miracles, the gap between the global rich and global poor continues to widen—increasingly also within single societies. A progressively mobile and flexible global economy is now in a position to relocate its production and transaction facilities to the cheapest environment. As a result of growing international corporate investment in low-wage countries, most notably China and India, the welfare systems of Western Europe, Japan, and North America are increasingly strained. Further, in other parts of the world a growing number of people are finding themselves losing to corporate globalization.

The sustained or even aggravated socioeconomic problems in many poor countries feed the mounting distrust of globalization. While modernization in principle continues to enjoy wide-ranging support in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, antipathy to the West, particularly the United States, is growing. In academic circles the reinvigorated search for cultural alternatives to Westernization programs has manifested itself in various schools of thought ranging from Orientalism to postcolonialism,<sup>9</sup> all of which problematize Western-centric discourses of civilization and their former role in colonial endeavors. Other related opinion camps suggest the possibility of culturally

specific forms of modernity, that is, forms of democratic polity and market economy that lie outside the spectrum of Western experiences.<sup>10</sup> The criticism of Western imperialism and its intellectual underpinnings has also weakened support for global standards, values, and institutions.<sup>11</sup> For example, important assets such as international law and human rights increasingly come under attack and are held to be Western instruments of power and cultural imperialism.<sup>12</sup>

As a consequence, in recent years scenarios of conflict have become prominent on the intellectual agenda. In addition to the notorious “clash of civilizations,” the term “empire” has aroused intensive discussions and polarized opinions. These range from the possibility of neoimperialist rivalries driven by the United States, China, and other powers,<sup>13</sup> to concerns about new deterritorialized forms of imperialism, centered around the global business world and the global financial markets.<sup>14</sup> In the eyes of many observers, the main actors of this arena may no longer be nation-states but transnational networks and alliances.<sup>15</sup> It remains rather doubtful whether other transnational networks such as non-governmental organizations that are often portrayed as the beginnings of a global civil society,<sup>16</sup> truly have the potential to reverse this trend.

The current situation makes transcultural and historical perspectives critical. If we look at parallels to the present challenges to a functional world order, the immediate predecessor of the current international system, the cold war constellation seems quite distant in terms of its international dynamics. The post-World War II period was largely typified by two ideologically charged superpower blocks with rather meager attempts of the third world and Europe to gain some degree of independent agency.<sup>17</sup> In many regards, more similar to the situation after the end of the cold war is the period between the early 1880s–1940s. Between the onset of high imperialism and the dusk of World War II, the world also experienced a confluence of globalization and polarization—with disastrous consequences that may contain some important historical lessons for today's world. Needless to say, history does not repeat itself, and the world of the early twentieth century was certainly structured in many ways structured in profoundly different ways. Yet, a new look at the possibilities and ultimate failures of this period that is often considered to have witnessed the first wave of globalization, may still provide some insights for the dynamics of our own time. This may prove quite significant for the current attempts to hold the balance of an arguably more modern but less Western, more interconnected, and yet more multipolar international system.

In many historical narratives the time span between the 1880–1930s is not depicted as a coherent period. For many historians the transformations around the end of World War I, most notably the decline of European supremacy, the rise of the United States as a global power, and the Russian

the North Atlantic were equally transformed by the forces of globalization. The myriad intergovernmental organizations that began to transform and standardize different societies were dominated by Western representatives—diplomats from other world regions were often not more than onlookers. This had great consequences for the ways in which the world was ordered in technical and practical terms. For example, European metric systems quickly spread all over the globe, and the new world time was based on European traditions.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, global events such as the world fairs or the Olympic Games did not even try to hide a sense of Western triumphalism. Even early forms of international nongovernmental activism such as the Red Cross could only spread from the West.<sup>33</sup>

Similarly the intergovernmental systems that were designed to prevent the world from slipping into conflict were almost exclusively centered on European powers. The Westphalian system of diplomatic regulations and international law between sovereign nation-state was only applied to a club of privileged countries. The beginnings of intergovernmental organizations that actively worked on a sustainable world order and international law eventually culminated in the Foundation of the League of Nations after World War I,<sup>34</sup> but it did not allow for full participation of the underdeveloped world. Often the colonial rhetoric of globalization was used to justify this condition—entire societies were denied the privilege of autonomy on the grounds of not being sufficiently civilized to determine their own fate within the international political arena. The standards of international law were only fully applied to those who met some ill-defined standards of civilization.<sup>35</sup> “Civilization” was commonly evoked to justify a world order divided into the privileged free and the unprivileged colonized.<sup>36</sup> In addition to hierarchies between cultures, the principle of racial and gender equality remained dispersed in early intergovernmental organizations. Today, by contrast, cultural and biological inequality is no longer even an issue at the level of diplomatic consultation.

Needless to say, even during the age of high imperialism the term “Westernization,” though highly suggestive, cannot adequately convey the complexity of mutual influence, hybridization, and cross-cultural entanglement. However, the idea that the non-Western world had to incorporate central aspects of European culture and political order remained basically shared by most influential circles outside Europe and the United States. During the mid-nineteenth century, the elites of much of Africa, China, Japan, and other world regions could at least try to uphold the myth of cultural and political autonomy. Not even half of a century later, Western dominance and the imperialist grip on the world had conjoined domestic and international politics all over the world. Visions of domestic order had become closely related to interpretations of the international system at large.

During the same period many concepts and institutions central to various interpretations of world order today had begun to spread globally during the decades around the turn of the twentieth century. For example, categories such as nation, class, and the rule of internationally anchored law started to become political realities in many parts of the world. Some intellectual and political concepts like modernity, tradition, and secularism have ever since been contested issues in such diverse regions as East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.<sup>37</sup> The Great War may have doomed European political supremacy but its immediate consequences did not profoundly challenge the position of the West as the global exporter of cultural and political models.

Still, seen from a global perspective, the catastrophes in Europe enhanced the diversification and confrontation of global ideologies. The 1920s witnessed the emergence of three rivaling ideological systems.<sup>38</sup> Each had a trans-cultural appeal, albeit with varying regional levels of influence. First there was the liberal vision, centered on ideals of development and free trade and mainly promoted by the United States and Western European powers, while in Latin America—a sort of liberal model continent in the mid-nineteenth century—most countries had largely moved away from liberal doctrines.<sup>39</sup> Second, with the founding of the Soviet Union, communism emerged as a real existing alternative to previously dominating visions of world order. Against discourses of civilization and liberalism, communism upheld the categories of class and hegemonic exploitation, and its opposition to imperialism and capitalism seemed to carry the promise of an egalitarian world.

The third main branch of ideologies that gained strength in the aftermath of World War I was the growing number of extreme rightist and fascist movements. Fascist ideologies did not contain elaborate conceptions of world order but were instead based on a critical attitude toward the existing international system. Social Darwinism and racial inequality were the key concepts shared by all fascist and proto-fascist ideologies.<sup>40</sup> As in the case of communism and liberalism, political support structures and financial networks facilitated the global appeal of fascism.<sup>41</sup> In other words, the rivaling ideologies of fascism, communism, and liberalism circulated in international networks, from where they were being applied to domestic arenas and intra-national power struggles. Quite contrary to the parameters of our time, local and trans-local religious groups, for instance, only rarely amounted to politically significant forces.

However, the great ideologies were by no means a mere projection of the critical issues inside Europe onto territories outside Europe. Rather, in each

World War II. In recent years, it has become increasingly obvious that mass long-distance migrations were not only a phenomenon of the Atlantic world, but rather of global extent. Close to 60 million people migrated from Europe to the Americas between 1846 and the 1930s, complemented, after the turn of the century, by large flows of Asian laborers to Brazil, Cuba, and California. At the same time, the frontiers of Manchuria and the rice fields and rubber plantations of Southeast Asia were the destinations for large migrations of Indians, Chinese, and Russians that added up to another roughly 100 million people. These flows into the Indian Ocean region and into Northeast Asia also challenge the received wisdom that mass migration largely came to an end in 1914. From a perspective of global history, mobility reached new peaks in the interwar period.<sup>46</sup>

Mobility was not just a sign of the times, but was also perceived as a major threat to the existing world order. Beginning in 1882, with the Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States, migration control emerged as one of the central devices with which the Western powers aimed to prevent the political status quo from dissolving. The anti-Chinese Policy in Australia, and the Alien Act in Great Britain in 1905, were important steps on a road, that, in the 1920s, led to immigration quotas in many countries, most notably the United States. The migration of large numbers of people around the globe was frequently met with xenophobic outbursts and violent pogroms. The limitation of mobility was an integral part of European colonial policy in Africa and Asia. Fingerprinting was used to check unwelcome immigrants in Argentina and India, and the passport developed into a universal tool for keeping the order of nations, culture, and race intact.<sup>47</sup> Mobility and the emergence of diaspora communities were seen, by the imperialist powers, as major forces undermining the political and legal order of the world.<sup>48</sup>

A more direct challenge was posed by the oppositional political movements that formed since the end of the nineteenth century. As “movements,” many political groupings not only related themselves to the increasing social and international mobility of the time, they also were often entangled in transregional networks. While the integration of the world led to processes of homogenization and assimilation, at the same time it produced new borders and countermovements. This dialectic of “globalization and fragmentation” was characteristic for the way the global and the local were articulated under the auspices of intensified interaction.<sup>49</sup> These movements were a product of the emerging public spheres, and a response of local elites to the disenchantment of the modernizing promises of the imperial order. The intensified entanglement of communicative public spheres enabled the actors and agents of these movements to connect and their visions and agendas to influence each other, across national and cultural borders.

Four kinds of oppositional movements played a prominent role between the 1880s–1930s. *First*, a number of nongovernmental organizations were established to reform and revise the existing world order from within. Originating mostly (but not always) in the West, these movements formed what could be termed a “subversive internationalism” in the late-nineteenth century and in the interwar period. Philanthropic movements, the 1893 Chicago Parliament of World Religions, the International Socialist and workers movement, the women’s associations, and the 1927 Congress of the Suppressed Nations in Brussels (with participants like Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah, Ho Chi Minh, and Aimé Césaire) all were part of international endeavors to question and undermine certain forms of political, social, and cultural hegemony, while in principle operating within the existing order.<sup>50</sup>

*Secondly*, the various nationalist movements that mushroomed at the turn of the century posed a serious challenge to the international order based on large overseas empires and international law. The nationalization of the world had many facets. In many regions, like New Zealand, Australia, China, Persia, and Siam, nation-states were formed at the end of the nineteenth century. However, the rise of mass nationalism also affected Latin American states as well as European polities, like the Habsburg Empire, and challenged multiethnic political entities from within. Outside the West, nationalism emerged as the leading ideology and eroded more encompassing definitions of belonging in places as diverse as Egypt, the Balkans, and India. While the spread of nationalism and the nation-state may be seen as part and parcel of the Westernization of the world, at the same time it set fire to a balance of large colonial empires based on Western hegemony.

While nationalism tended to question multiethnic empires, the rise of regionalism can be seen as a concomitant—and *third*—movement aiming to revise the existing world order. The debate about the emergence of just a few “world empires”—the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and possibly Germany—caught the fancy of many politicians and commentators before World War I: “world empire or doom” was one of the slogans of the day.<sup>51</sup> Taking the Monroe doctrine as their model, visionaries like Friedrich Naumann in Germany aimed to construct larger geopolitical units like “Central Europe” (the title of Naumann’s book in 1915) that enabled political and economic autarky. The Pan-movements advocated a different form of regionalism based on cultural and ethnic commonalities. In the political arena, these movements remained rather marginal since they were not able to establish a support base that was comparable to the nation-state. Their main challenge lay in the cultural claim they posed to the existing order, even though they were constructed around politicized concepts and geographical



## CHAPTER 8

# A Global Anti-Western Moment? The Russo-Japanese War, Decolonization, and Asian Modernity

*Cemil Aydin*

The Russo-Japanese War in 1905 was interpreted throughout the world as the first victory of an Asian nation belonging to the yellow race against a major white and Christian Western empire.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the world-historical significance of the Japanese victory over Russia was noted by a wide array of contemporary observers, writing in the immediate aftermath of the war.<sup>2</sup> This interpretation of the Japanese military victory transformed the character of reformist thought, perceptions of the Western Civilization and the critiques of international order in the major centers of the non-Western world, from Egypt, Iran, and Turkey to India, Vietnam, and China.<sup>3</sup> However, the celebration by Asian and African intellectuals of the Russo-Japanese War as a turning point in their critique of the Eurocentric world order was highly paradoxical. Japan fought the war with Russia over the control of Korea and Manchuria. It achieved its military victory partly due to the support it received from the Western superpower of the time, Great Britain, and partly due to the borrowing of huge sums of money from American banks. The Japanese elite was proud of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which symbolized the civilized status of their nation.<sup>4</sup>

from the expectations, ideas and networks created by these two anti-Western visions.

### *Intellectual Impact: Japan as a Metaphor for Asian Modernities*

The rise of Japan as the only nonwhite world power facilitated an increase of the Asian interest in the Japanese experience of modernization. In many circles, Japan began to serve as a metaphor for Asian modernity for the Ottomans, Egyptians, and Indians. The idea of a successful model of modernity in a non-European cultural zone was crucial for the nationalist claim to cultural authenticity, while at the same time embracing the universality of a Eurocentric model of progress and development. In this sense, Asian writings on the achievements of Japan's successful merger of traditional cultural elements with universal aspects of Western modernity were a form of affirmation that Ottomans, Egyptians, Iranians, or Indians could also modernize without any fear of loosing their national and cultural identity, and moreover, their authentic cultural and religious difference from Europe are never an obstacle for modernization.

Within that spirit, many reformers wanted to know what would be necessary to copy, for their own societies, in order to achieve what Japan had achieved in the three decades of reform after the Meiji Restoration.<sup>48</sup> The search for the secrets of Japan's progress was in harmony with the predominant appropriation of Social Darwinist notions of development and progress by Asian nationalists. Contrary to the deterministic interpretations of social Darwinism, and the writings of Herbert Spencer, reformists in Asia downplayed the determinism in favor of an optimistic and voluntaristic idea of reviving the nation or civilization.<sup>49</sup> For them, the actions and the willpower of the "young" nationalists of Asia were sufficient to overcome the seemingly scientific social and geographical determinants of Asian backwardness. Japan became the best example of a national willpower that could indeed close the developmental gap between Europe and Asia, a task previously deemed impossible according to the dominant social science theories or Darwinist and Spencerian notions of that time. This observation led to a search for the reasons, or "secrets," behind the "rise of Japan," and to reflections not only about the Meiji reform experience of the Japanese government, but also the character of the Japanese people. The Japanese model became an educational tool for almost all the conflicting ideological currents in the Ottoman State, Egypt and India, ranging from Social Darwinist secularists to Muslim and Hindu modernists, and from supporters of a strong monarchy to constitutionalists.

The secrets of Japanese progress were commonly attributed to Meiji state policies in compulsory public education, participatory politics and constitution, and to policies of industrial development. After describing the secrets of Japanese progress, one Egyptian paper expressed the hope that Japan would become Asia's teacher not only in the tangible skills of successful military technology, commerce, and agriculture, but also in the importance of education and patriotism.<sup>50</sup> Ottoman, Egyptian, and Indian writings on the secrets of Japanese progress reflected the dilemma on the issue of attributing Japanese success either to exceptional Japanese traits or to universally applicable policies that the Meiji leadership had executed. If the Japanese success was solely due to Japan's peculiar traditions and national culture, as several well-known European and Japanese interpretations argued, Japan could only be the exception that proved the rule of Asia's permanent backwardness. For example, Nitobe Inazô argued that the ethical training of Japanese individuals inherited from the martial tradition of the Samurai, *bushido*, explained Japan's extraordinary success in modernity. For Nitobe, to understand the principle and single driving force behind the success of Japan's transformation after the Meiji Restoration required more than a focus only on education or technological and industrial advances: "It is the spirit that quickeneth, without which the best of implements profiteth but little."<sup>51</sup> This meant that other Asian nations were still incapable of reaching the same high levels of progress and civilization. However, avoiding such a pessimistic conclusion, and in hopes of affirming an "awakening of Asia" through the symbol of Japan, other Asian commentators usually concluded that Japan's path to progress could be emulated by other Eastern nations, even if there remained certain peculiar aspects of Japanese culture that explained Japan's achievements.

We can see an example of the tension between a particularistic and a universalistic interpretation of Japan's achievement in the discussion arising from a conference on the Renaissance of Japan organized by the Committee of Union and Progress, the party of the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, in Istanbul in 1911. The audience included high ranking and influential figures such as the Ottoman Prince Abdülmejid Efendi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, both of whom would naturally have been inclined to hear the secrets of Japanese success that could be taken as policy-oriented lessons for the Ottomans. The main speaker was the Austria-Hungarian advisor to the Ottoman Ministry of Justice, Comte Leon Ostrog (1867–1932). Ostrog explained the Japanese success not as a miracle, but as a consequence of the fundamental inclinations of the Japanese people, the most important of which was the recognition of the value of adopting the ways of a superior foreign civilization. In addition to underscoring Japan's historically "unique"

intelligently selected the useful and essential aspects of Western civilization for adoption, without the need for appropriating “superficial and harmful” Western habits and denying its cultural heritage. In truth, the heritage that was preserved was more an invented image of traditional Japan than it was a reflection of the actual continuity of pre-Meiji Japanese culture.<sup>58</sup> However, this concept of a Japanese selectivity that could effectively synthesize Western and Eastern knowledge was very significant from the perspective of Asian nationalism, which had been preoccupied with the question of an East-West encounter and civilizational harmony since the 1880s.<sup>59</sup> For example, the *Good Wife, Wise Mother* ideology that Japan had adopted from European culture was regarded as a successful preservation of the Japanese tradition in a modernizing context, since women could actively serve the self-strengthening of the nation through Westernizing reforms without losing their traditional cultural role.<sup>60</sup> Throughout the Middle East, the imagery focusing on the progressive role of Japanese women in social life while preserving their traditional duties became a constant reference point among nationalists.<sup>61</sup> For intellectuals thinking within the paradigms of a synthesis between East and West, then, Japan presented a far better model than Germany or France, since it offered proof that native cultural traditions could indeed be compatible with modern civilization. For instance, the most prominent theorist of Turkish national identity, Ziya Gökalp, often referred to the Japanese historical experience in relation to his arguments that modern Turkey need not be afraid of losing its Muslim religion and national culture in the process of appropriating universal modernity.<sup>62</sup>

Third, the rise of Japan engendered optimism that it was not too late for Ottoman, Egyptian, and Indian reformers to bring their own societies to modernity and international equality. At the time of Japan's rise, Egypt and India were under colonial rule, while the Ottoman State, though politically independent, was still subject to unequal treaties and Western interventions into domestic affairs and had been dubbed the “sick man of Europe.” A widespread mood of pessimism over the failure of the Ottoman reforms was combined with the newly popularized Darwinist ideologies of racial and civilizational hierarchies and led to the conviction that not only the Ottoman failures but the overall backwardness of Asian societies could be attributed to an inherent “incapability” of Easterners, as opposed to Westerners, to civilize themselves.<sup>63</sup> In this context, Japan's example of catching up with Western civilization in just three decades served as an inspiration to Ottoman reformers to rejuvenate radical reformism with renewed optimism.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, in colonized societies such as Egypt, Indonesia, and India, an emphasis on the racial and cultural similarity they shared with the Japanese under the banner

of Eastern identity made it possible for the nationalist movements in those societies to find new legitimacy in their struggle against colonialism. After all, if “the Japanese could succeed, the Javaneese could do it too,” and thus they would not need the “civilizing mission” of the Dutch colonial rule.<sup>65</sup>

### Conclusion

The Russo-Japanese War demonstrated that Western powers could no longer justify grabbing non-Western lands by pointing to the alleged superiority of the Western race and civilization. It was also a turning point in the history of both modernist ideologies and anti-Western critiques. From the Russo-Japanese War until World War I, the contradictions in the legitimacy structures of the international order, namely the civilizing mission ideology, became more obvious. Globally, the debates on the concept of racial hierarchies, and the ideas of Eastern and Western civilizations became more intensified and politicized. Three aspects of these debates are especially important for the historical trajectory of anti-Western critiques and alternative visions of world order. First, the Russo-Japanese War sealed the loss of legitimacy for the existing Eurocentric world order. Anticolonial nationalists and intellectuals all over Asia successfully utilized the Japanese victory to counter the earlier discourse of white race supremacy and the backwardness of the contemporary Oriental cultures. Second, Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asianist visions became part of the realist discourse of world politics. Nationalist movements all over Asia embraced the anti-Western internationalism of Pan-Asian and Pan-Islamic thought as a potential form of empowerment in their demands for autonomy and equality in the international system. Third, the Russo-Japanese War and the subsequent series of constitutional revolutions in Asia (Iran in 1906, Turkey in 1908, and China in 1911) established a self-consciousness of the era as the “awakening of the East,” preceding the era of WWI described as the “decline of the West.” Gradually, the meanings of “Asia” and “East” in relation to the West were redefined, in a reverse Orientalist strategy, to match the political realities of this period. The global moment of the Russo-Japanese War not only became a turning point in the history of decolonization of Asia, but also the precondition for the interpretation of World War I as the “decline of the West.” In the long trajectory from the 1880s to the mid-1930s, recognizing the moment of 1905 would help us rethink the subjectivity of the non-Western world in the history of decolonization. Were there no “awakening East” associated with the 1905–1914 period, the “decline of the West” in World War I would be insufficient for describing the intellectual and political collapse of the Eurocentric world order during the interwar era.

## Beyond Hegemony? – Europe and the Politics of Non-Western Elites, 1900–1930

Sebastian Conrad

### Vorwort: «Europa» aus der Sicht nichtwestlicher Eliten, 1900–1930

Seit der Veröffentlichung von Edward Saids *Orientalism* im Jahre 1978 hat die These von einem europäischen «Monolog» in der Auseinandersetzung mit nicht-europäischen Gesellschaften eine Diskussion in Gang gebracht, deren Beiträge und Publikationen mittlerweile kaum mehr zu übersehen sind. Auch wenn die zeitgenössischen Stimmen indischer, chinesischer oder arabischer Intellektueller dabei durchaus eine Rolle spielten, lag der Schwerpunkt der Forschung doch auf dem Bild, das sich europäische Reisende, Diplomaten und Gelehrte von anderen Kulturen machten. Sie beschrieben fremde Sitten und Bräuche, soziale Ordnungen und Institutionen, aber in vielen Fällen konstituierten sie die Gesellschaften auch, von denen sie schrieben.<sup>1</sup>

Seit einigen Jahren hat sich der Schwerpunkt des Interesses verlagert. Vor allem als Folge des erneuten Aufschwungs religiöser und kultureller Fundamentalismen richtet sich die Aufmerksamkeit der Forschung verstärkt auf die Auseinandersetzung mit Europa und dem «Westen» in anderen Teilen der Welt. Häufig zielt die zentrale Fragestellung dieser Untersuchungen darauf, die aktuellen Vorstellungen von einem «Kampf der Kulturen» historisch einzuordnen und zu kontextualisieren. Dahinter steht nicht selten die Hypothese, die unterschiedlichen Formen der Interpretation und Aneignung «Europas» hätten vielerorts multiple, alternative Formen der Moderne – oder gar Alternativen zur Moderne? – hervorgebracht, deren Dynamik sich nicht aus der Differenz zu einer westeuropäischen Blaupause errechnen ließ.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. E. W. Said, *Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient*, London 1991; J. M. MacKenzie, «The «Orientalism» Debate», in: *Orientalism. History, Theory, and the Arts*. Hg. ders., Manchester 1995, 1–19. Vgl. etwa auch J. Osterhammel, *Die Entzauberung Asiens. Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 19. Jahrhundert*, München 1998.

<sup>2</sup> Zum Konzept der *multiple modernities* vgl. S. N.

Eisenstadt, «Vielfältige Modernen», in: *Zeitschrift für Weltgeschichte* 2 (2001), 9–33. Vgl. auch das Sonderheft der Zeitschrift *Daedalus* über «Multiple Modernities» im Winter 2000 sowie D. Sachsenmaier / J. Riedel / S. N. Eisenstadt (Hg.), *Reflections on Multiple Modernities. European, Chinese and Other Interpretations*, Leiden 2002.

Für die Strategien der Selbstvergewisserung kultureller und politischer Eliten in China, Japan und Indien, in Afrika und im Osmanischen Reich war spätestens seit Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts der Verweis auf Europa und den «Westen» ein zentraler (wenn auch keineswegs der einzige) Bezugspunkt. Eine Analyse der konkurrierenden und multiperspektivischen Bezugnahmen ist Teil einer Geschichte der Globalisierung, die sich von einem Narrativ der Entstehung der Weltwirtschaft und der diplomatischen Verflechtung löst und auch der sozial- und kulturgeschichtlichen Dimension grenzüberschreitender Interaktionen ihre Aufmerksamkeit widmet.<sup>3</sup> Zugleich tragen diese Perspektiven auf Europa auch zu einer breiter gefaßten Geschichte Europas bei. Ungeachtet aller strukturellen Gemeinsamkeiten, die europäische Gesellschaften miteinander verbanden, ungeachtet auch der Erschließung Europas als Erfahrungsraum in der Folge zunehmender Begegnungen und Kontakte, Austauschbeziehungen und der medial vermittelten Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit: In der Sicht außereuropäischer Beobachter erschien «Europa» häufig homogener und geschlossener, als seine Bewohner es selbst erlebten. Zur Außenwirkung Europas, aber auch zu seinem Selbstverständnis trug dieses Bild nachhaltig bei.<sup>4</sup>

### 1. Okzidentalismus

Die Beschäftigung mit Europa konnte ganz unterschiedliche Formen annehmen und variierte im Grad ihrer Institutionalisierung. In Indien etwa blieb das traditionelle brahmanische Verbot, die «schwarzen Wasser» (*kala pani*) zu überqueren, bis ins 19. Jahrhundert hinein wirksam, und noch Gandhi mußte sich mit dem Vorwurf des Tabubruchs auseinandersetzen, als er nach England zum Studium reiste. In Japan hingegen hatte die systematische Auseinandersetzung mit westlichem Wissen in Form der «Hollandkunde» (*rangaku*) bereits in der vormodernen Epoche eingesetzt. Vor allem naturwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen sowie medizinische, militärtechnische und agrarwissenschaftliche Texte wurden in besonderen Schulen, die lange Zeit noch einen subversiven Charakter besaßen, studiert.<sup>5</sup>

Diese Formen der Europakunde, von Reiseberichten bis hin zu wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen, sind inzwischen recht gut dokumentiert.<sup>6</sup> Häufig standen in

3 Als Einführung vgl. A. G. Hopkins (Hg.), *Globalization in World History*, London 2002; J. Osterhammel / N. P. Petersson, *Geschichte der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen*, München 2003; C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914. Global Connections and Comparisons*, Oxford 2004.

4 H.-G. Haupt, «Erfahrungen mit Europa. Ansätze zu einer Geschichte Europas im langen 19. Jahrhundert», in: «Europäische Geschichte» als historiographisches Problem. Hg. H. Duchhardt und A. Kunz, Mainz 1997, 87–104, 88–89. Vgl. auch J. Oster-

hammel, «Europamodelle und imperiale Kontexte», in: *Journal of Modern European History* 2 (2004), 157–181.

5 G. K. Goodman, *Japan and the Dutch*, Richmond / Va. 2000; D. Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe*, Stanford / Calif. 1969; R. Rubinger, *Private Academies of Tokugawa Japan*, Princeton / N. J. 1982; J. Proust, *Europe through the Prism of Japan: Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, Notre Dame / Ind. 2002.

6 Vgl. beispielsweise I. Abu-Lughod, *The Arab Rediscovery of Europe*, Princeton / N. J. 1963; M. Harbsmeier, «Schauspiel Europa. Die außereuropäische →

der wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung der Europawahrnehmung vor allem zwei Fragen im Vordergrund: Einerseits wurde nach Einflüssen europäischen Denkens oder europäischer Wissenschaften auf die kulturellen Entwicklungen in außereuropäischen Gesellschaften gefragt; nicht selten beruhten diese Untersuchungen auf der Annahme, daß diese Einflüsse in Fehldeutungen und kulturellen «Mißverständnissen» ihre Grenzen hatten.<sup>7</sup> Andererseits wurden Europa-Bilder oder Fremdheitserfahrungen thematisiert, häufig mit einem ethnographischen Interesse an Fragen der interkulturellen Kontakte und der Kommunikation.<sup>8</sup>

Dabei konnte in den Hintergrund geraten, in welchem Maße diese Imagologie nicht nur einer Eigenlogik folgte bzw. an frühere Traditionen angeschlossen, sondern eingebunden war in einen geopolitischen Kontext, der von ungleichen Machtbeziehungen gekennzeichnet war. Die folgenden Aufsätze machen deutlich, daß die Perspektiven von Europa stets mit konkreten Interessen und Konstellationen sowie einem politischen Einsatz verbunden waren. Die Sicht auf Europa – die ja immer ein Teil der Selbstverständigung war – **läßt sich außerhalb der asymmetrischen Ordnung der Welt, der kolonialen Strukturen sowie der kapitalistisch funktionierenden Weltwirtschaft kaum verstehen.** Sie war aber auch eine Angelegenheit unterschiedlicher Gruppen und Akteure mit konkreten Interessen und Anliegen. Überdies waren «Europakunde» und Europawahrnehmungen mit impliziten Annahmen über den Zusammenhang von Moderne, Fortschritt und das, was Dipesh Chakrabarty als das «hyperreale Europa» bezeichnet hat, untrennbar verbunden.<sup>9</sup>

Die Untersuchung nichteuropäischer Perspektiven auf Europa ist Teil einer Genealogie des «Okzidentalismus».<sup>10</sup> In jüngerer Zeit hat vor allem die Polemik von Ian Buruma und Avishai Margalit für Aufmerksamkeit gesorgt. Die beiden

Entdeckung Europas im 19. Jahrhundert am Beispiel afrikanischer Texte», in: *Historische Anthropologie* 2 (1994), 331–350; W. Ende, *Europabild und kulturelles Selbstbewußtsein bei den Muslimen am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Hamburg 1965.

7 Vgl. etwa C. Blacker, *The Japanese Enlightenment, A Study of the Writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi*, Cambridge 1969. Vgl. zur Problematik dieser Transfers L. H. Liu, *Translingual Practice. Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity. China 1900–1937*, Stanford / Calif. 1995.

8 Typisch für diese Perspektive waren beispielsweise T. Todorov, *Die Eroberung Amerikas. Das Problem des Anderen*, Frankfurt / M. 1985; S. Greenblatt, *Wunderbare Besitztümer. Die Erfindung des Fremden. Reisende und Entdecker*, Darmstadt 1994. Vgl. für Europa-Reisende etwa Feng Chen, *Die Entdeckung des Westens. Chinas erste Botschafter in Europa 1866–1894*, Frankfurt / M. 2001.

9 D. Chakrabarty, «Europa provinzialisieren. Postkolonialität und die Kritik der Geschichte», in: *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven*

in den *Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*. Hg. S. Conrad und S. Randeria, Frankfurt / M. 2002, 284–313.

10 Der Begriff des «Okzidentalismus» wird mit ganz unterschiedlichen Perspektiven in Verbindung gebracht. Susanne Zantop meint damit die europäische Perspektive auf die westliche Hemisphäre, in erster Linie Lateinamerika (S. Zantop, *Kolonialphantasien im vorkolonialen Deutschland (1770–1870)*, Berlin 1999). Fernando Coronil hingegen bezieht sich auf stillschweigende Annahmen über die eigenen kulturellen Fundamente, die dem orientalistischen Paradigma zugrunde liegen (F. Coronil, «Jenseits des Okzidentalismus. Unterwegs zu nichtimperialen geohistorischen Kategorien», in: *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus*. Hg. Conrad und Randeria, 177–218). Xiaomei Chen bezeichnet die Aneignung westlicher Diskurse in China als «Okzidentalismus» (Xiaomei Chen, *Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China*, New York 2002).

Die Bezugnahme auf «Europa» war in erster Linie eine Angelegenheit gebildeter Schichten und intellektueller bzw. politischer Eliten. Sie verfolgten dabei häufig unterschiedliche Ziele, die sich sowohl auf die «Selbststärkung» (*yangwu*, so der Slogan in Qing-China) der eigenen Nation angesichts kolonialer Bedrohung als auch auf die Durchsetzung eigener Ansprüche innerhalb der Gesellschaft richten konnten. Die Voraussetzung für eine intensivere Auseinandersetzung mit Europa waren die Zunahme grenzüberschreitender Austauschbeziehungen und die damit einhergehende Herausbildung eines globalen Bewußtseins. Der Geograph David Harvey hat von der «Zeit-Raum-Kompression» gesprochen, die am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts den technologischen Wandel begleitete.<sup>15</sup> Grundlage dafür war die Informationsrevolution seit den 1850er Jahren. Das Dampfschiff, die Ausweitung der Postverbindungen und vor allem der Telegraph trugen zum Eindruck einer schrumpfenden Welt bei.<sup>16</sup>

«Die Bedingungen, unter denen wir leben», deklarierte enthusiastisch Sandford Fleming, der sich um die Einführung einer Weltzeit bemühte, «sind nicht länger dieselben. Die Anwendung der Wissenschaft zum Zwecke der Fortbewegung und der zeitgleichen Übermittlung von Gedanken und Rede haben allmählich den Raum zusammengezogen und Distanz vernichtet. Die ganze Welt wird in unmittelbare Nachbarschaft und enge Beziehungen hineingezogen.»<sup>17</sup>

Diese Sicht war gewiß übertrieben. Aber die technologischen Neuerungen waren ein wichtiger Faktor bei der Herausbildung von Öffentlichkeiten in Lateinamerika, Süd- und Ostasien oder dem Osmanischen Reich. Häufig griffen sie dabei auf bestehende Diskussionsforen und Teilöffentlichkeiten zurück.<sup>18</sup> Aber vor allem in den urbanen Zentren und Hafenstädten bildeten sich rasch neue Formen der öffentlichen Kommunikation, häufig getragen von neu formierten metropolitanen Eliten, die sich über die neu entwickelten Bildungssysteme rekrutierten.<sup>19</sup> Vor allem die Ausbreitung des Pressewesens und die entstehende Zeitungskultur trugen seit Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts zur raschen Verbreitung von Ideen bei und waren eine Voraussetzung der differenzierten Auseinandersetzung mit «Europa».<sup>20</sup>

15 D. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity. An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Oxford 1989.

16 Vgl. P. J. Hugill, *Global Communications since 1844. Geopolitics and Technology*, Baltimore / Md. 1999; A. Mattelart, *Kommunikation ohne Grenzen? Geschichte der Ideen und Strategien globaler Vernetzung*, Rodenbach 1999; D. R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress. Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1840–1914*, New York 1988; ders., *The Invisible Weapon. Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1914*, Oxford 1991.

17 Zitiert nach: M. Dörries, «Krakatau 1883. Die Welt

als Labor und Erfahrungsraum», in: *Welt-Räume: Geschichte, Geographie und Globalisierung seit 1900*. Hg. I. Schröder und S. Hoher, Frankfurt / M. 2005, 68.

18 Vgl. am indischen Beispiel die großartige Studie von C. A. Bayly, *Empire and Information. Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870*, Cambridge 1996.

19 Vgl. F. Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of the Empire. Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, New York 1996.

20 Vgl. J. Judge, *Print and Politics. «Shibao» and the Culture of Reform in Late Imperial China*, Stanford /

Tapan Raychaudhuri hat eine Typologie der Haltung intellektueller Eliten vorgeschlagen, um die indische «Xenologie Europas» analytisch fassen zu können. Seine Unterscheidungen lassen sich im großen und ganzen auch auf andere Gesellschaften übertragen, die im 19. Jahrhundert vom «Anpassungsdruck» europäischer Normen und Institutionen erfaßt wurden.<sup>21</sup> Dazu rechnet er *erstens* Vertreter der traditionellen Eliten, deren Weltsicht durch die Begegnung mit dem «Westen» zunächst kaum beeinflußt wurde. Diese Stimmen waren vor allem im frühen 19. Jahrhundert zu vernehmen, und sie waren unter Brahmanen vermutlich häufiger als unter Muslimen, die auf eine eigene Tradition der Xenologie zurückgreifen konnten. Im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts wurde dies jedoch zunehmend zu einer Minderheitenposition. Denn – *zweitens* – die große Mehrheit derjenigen, die sich öffentlich äußerten, teilte jedenfalls in den Grundsätzen die Sicht der britischen Politiker und Orientalisten, die Indien als eine rückständige Gesellschaft betrachteten. Viele Vertreter der gebildeten Schichten propagierten daher eine entschlossene Reformpolitik – am kompromißlosesten die Gruppe «Young Bengal» um Henry Derozio, die mit großem Enthusiasmus die Übernahme westlicher Sitten propagierte, europäische Kleidung und Eßgewohnheiten übernahm und sich über den irrationalen Charakter einheimischer Bräuche lustig machte. Meistens war der modernisierende Impuls jedoch auch mit Vorbehalten gegenüber dem Kolonialismus verbunden. Zudem war die Bewunderung für den Westen selten bedingungslos und ohne Einschränkungen. So berief sich etwa Rammohun Roy (1772–1833), einer der Pioniere der indischen Moderne, in seinen reformerischen Aktivitäten auf Universalismus und Rationalität, nicht ohne dabei die irrationalen und nichtuniversalisierbaren Aspekte westlicher Kultur einer Kritik zu unterziehen.<sup>22</sup>

*Drittens* mehrten sich im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts die kritischen Stimmen, deren Protest sich nicht so sehr an Werten und Normen, sondern an den konkreten Ausprägungen britischer Politik in Indien entzündete. Diese Form der Kritik an «Europa» basierte meist selbst auf den Annahmen der europäischen Aufklärung. Sie bezog sich etwa auf die mangelnde Umsetzung politischer Freiheit und Demokratie, auf christliche Intoleranz, auf den aggressiven Nationalismus, die koloniale Herrschaft und die zunehmende Einschränkung der emanzipato-

Calif. 1996; D. Glaß, *Der Muqtataf und seine Öffentlichkeit. Aufklärung, Rasonnement und Meinungsstreit in der frühen arabischen Zeitschriftenkommunikation. Analyse medialer und sozialer Strukturen. Streitgesprächsprotokolle*, 2 Bde., Würzburg 2004; N. Vittinghoff, *Die Anfänge des Journalismus in China (1860–1911)*, Wiesbaden 2002.

21 Vgl. für das folgende T. Raychaudhuri, *Perceptions, Emotions, Sensibilities. Essays on India's Colonial and Post-colonial Experiences*, Neu-Delhi 1999. Zu den unterschiedlichen Modi der Aneignung «west-

licher» Vorstellungen vgl. auch das instruktive Kapitel bei B. Parekh, *Colonialism, Tradition and Reform. An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse*, Neu Delhi 1989, 34–70. Vgl. auch S. Hirakawa, »Japan's Turn to the West«, in: *Modern Japanese Thought*. Hg. B. Tadashi Wakabayashi, Cambridge 1998, 30–97.

22 Vgl. J. N. Pankratz, »Rammohun Roy«, in: *Religion in Modern India*. Hg. R. D. Baird, Neu-Delhi 1991, 275–289.

rischen Versprechen der Aufklärung durch den Einfluß des Rassediskurses.<sup>23</sup> Schließlich wurde jedoch auch, *viertens*, Kritik auf der Basis traditioneller Werte formuliert. Die Präferenz für herkömmliche Lebensstile führte zu Kritik am westlichen Konsumdenken, an Industrialisierung und Fabrikarbeit, an der Mechanisierung des modernen Lebens, an der Apotheose des Nationalstaats und in erster Linie am Individualismus, der als Egoismus verstanden wurde. Dabei wurde häufig auf eine Dichotomie zurückgegriffen, die auch in anderen Gesellschaften regelmäßig evoziert wurde: Die Bereitschaft zur Übernahme der praktischen Fähigkeiten der Europäer ging einher mit einer Überzeugung von der «spirituellen» Überlegenheit der östlichen Zivilisationen, wie sie etwa von Tagore vertreten wurde.<sup>24</sup> In Japan sprach man von *wakon yōsai*, dem komplementären Verhältnis von westlicher Technik und japanischem «Geist», in China von *ti-yong*.<sup>25</sup> Die rasche Aneignung von Wissenschaft, Empirismus und Technologie wurde vor allem seit den 1880er Jahren von Bezugnahmen auf «traditionale» Werte begleitet, die im Zuge der Modernisierung eine neue Form und Valenz angenommen hatten.

Diese Unterscheidung konkurrierender Perspektiven auf «Europa» orientiert sich an Idealtypen; in der Realität konnten sich unterschiedliche Aspekte überlagern. Häufig waren auch biographische Entwicklungen, etwa von einer Begeisterung für alles Europäische hin zu nationalistischen oder gar traditionalistischen Perspektiven, wie etwa im Falle des japanischen Journalisten Tokutomi Sohō.<sup>26</sup> «Europa» erschien in den Auslassungen dieser Intellektuellen häufig als Einheit, oft gleichgesetzt mit dem «Westen». Wenn es darauf ankam, wurde jedoch deutlich differenziert – und beispielsweise in Japan ein amerikanisches, französisches und deutsches Bildungswesen gegeneinander ausgespielt.<sup>27</sup>

Die Bezugnahme auf «Europa» in den Debatten intellektueller Eliten war beinahe ubiquitär. Zugleich blieben allerdings in vielen Gesellschaften außerhalb der urbanen Zentren auch im späten 19. Jahrhundert breite Bevölkerungsschichten ohne eine klare Vorstellung von Europa. Ebenso wichtig ist die Einsicht, daß «Europa» oder der «Westen» im späten 19. Jahrhundert keineswegs die einzigen Orientierungspunkte für politische Eliten darstellten. Regionale Austauschbeziehungen dauerten fort und starben häufig auch dann nicht ab, wenn die Interaktion mit den westlichen Großmächten an Bedeutung gewann. Das galt etwa für


23 Vgl. dazu den Beitrag von Cemil Aydin in diesem Heft.

24 Vgl. dazu S. N. Hay, *Asian Ideas of East and West. Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India*, Cambridge / Mass. 1970.

25 Einen Überblick über intellektuelle Strömungen in China vermittelt C. Furth, «Intellectual Change. From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895–1920», in: *An Intellectual History of Modern China*. Hg. M. Goldman und Leo Ou-Fan Lee, Cambridge 2002, 13–96.

26 Vgl. J. D. Pierson, *Tokutomi Sohō 1863–1957. A Journalist for Modern Japan*, Princeton / N. J. 1980.

27 Vgl. M. Nagai, «Westernization and Japanization. The Early Meiji Transformation of Education», in: *Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture*. Hg. D. H. Shiveley, Princeton / N. J. 1971, 35–76. Diese «Anleihen» wurden jedoch stets unter spezifischen lokalen Bedingungen getätigt. Vgl. dazu B. Platt, *Burning and Building. Schooling and State Formation in Japan, 1750–1890*, Cambridge / Mass. 2004.



CHAPTER 7

Global Mobility and Nationalism:  
Chinese Migration and the  
Reterritorialization of Belonging,  
1880–1910

*Sebastian Conrad and Klaus Mühlhahn*

Globalization is not only the catchword of the day. At the same time, it refers back to a longer history, and historians have in recent years begun to analyze its genealogy. The years between 1880 and 1914, in particular, have caught the attention of recent scholarship as a high time of global exchange and cross-border interaction.<sup>1</sup> The integration of the international economy, the political and imperial expansion of the West, and the increase in cultural exchanges across national borders contributed to a complex set of networks of global engagements. This did not go unnoticed by contemporaries who witnessed the process with enthusiasm, or apprehension. The integration of the world was indeed accompanied by the emergence of a form of global consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

The integration of the world, together with the global consciousness that corresponded with it, made possible, and produced, connections between processes that had until then developed largely within regional contexts. Social and political actors increasingly made reference to similar developments outside their own regions or states. Social phenomena and, above all, economic developments in seemingly distant societies were referred to as models and yardsticks; at the same time there emerged a growing awareness

that what happened elsewhere no longer left one's own society unaffected. Even if the entanglement of the world did not encompass all societies and people in the same way, it had its effects on processes that for the main part had previously evolved in relative isolation. These effects could be homogenizing, but at the same time the growing interaction produced opposition and fragmentation—even if differences were increasingly expressed in similar ways.<sup>3</sup> Globalizing effects were palpable in realms ranging from knowledge and science to the arts, constitutional developments, and ideologies and worldviews. However, they could also be observed in a sphere would seemingly be at odds with the transnational promises of globalization: namely, nationalism.

In many regions, nationalism had a longer history that dated back, as in the case of Western Europe and Latin America, at least to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. Also in other parts of the world, for example in Japan or China, early formations of nationalism emerged in the beginning of or during the nineteenth century. In many places, nationalism was the product of a complex set of social conditions and political discourses within a society and its regional contexts. However, these long-standing (and “internal”) traditions of nationalism notwithstanding, the integration of the world at the end of the century worked as an additional and external factor that decisively influenced the trajectories of nationalism across the world. In many places (New Zealand, Australia, China, Persia, and Siam, among others) the nation-state was an invention of the late nineteenth century. Moreover, the emergence of a world order of nation-states went hand in hand with the spread of nationalism that now emerged virtually everywhere—for example, in Egypt, the Balkans, in India—as the privileged form of political discourse. Even in societies in which the nation-state looked back to a longer history, the discourse of nationalism was frequently influenced by the waves of globalization since the 1880s.<sup>4</sup>

This chapter argues that among the many dimensions of the increasing entanglement of the world, it was the process of mobility and migration that particularly affected the global discourse on what it meant to be a nation. The mobility of large numbers of people—not only of diplomats, tourists, and aristocrats on their Grand tour, but primarily of large groups of unskilled workers—was one of the defining characteristics of globalization in the late nineteenth century. Recent scholarship has shown that between 1840 and the 1930s, more than 150 million people left their countries of origin for elsewhere, often times to settle permanently. The 60 million Europeans that left the Old World in order to begin a life in the New World were complemented by large flows of people from India and Southern China to the areas in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, and by large transborder migrations in

Northeast Asia.<sup>5</sup> However, these global movements were accompanied by the erection of global walls. The movement and circulation of people, in other words, proved to be a rather paradoxical process: a truly transnational phenomenon that at the same time reinforced national borders and mechanisms of exclusion.<sup>6</sup>

This reterritorialization of the world in the context of mobility and migration took different forms. Most tangibly, at the turn of the century, most states developed strategies to channel, control, and counter the steady human flow in and out of the country: by issuing passports, introducing ethnic quotas, reinforcing borders and immigration controls, by biometric technologies and limitations to citizenship. Before World War I, the character of national borders changed decisively, even if these changes were not visible on a map. What used to be largely symbolic lines were now turned into veritable impediments to free movement and mobility.<sup>7</sup> Second, the large flows of immigration contributed to the strengthening of notions of ethnic and racial limitations to national belonging. While the ethnic essentialization of nationality, too, often had a longer “internal” genealogy (as in the case of Antisemitism in Central Europe), the xenophobia elicited by mass migration since the late nineteenth century, frequently reinforced the ethnic connotations of nationality and citizenship. Finally, the global circulation of goods and people contributed to an awareness of the global and systemic context in which nation-states existed and asserted themselves.

In what follows, then, we will attempt to trace the effects of the globalization process, and in particular the increase in global mobility, as an additional and external factor that shaped—and synchronized—the discourse and practice of nationalism in very different locations. In making this point we will discuss one of the most significant examples of migration on a worldwide scale: Chinese migration that in fact can be seen as an epitome for the larger phenomenon of global flows of mobility so characteristic of the nineteenth century. It has been estimated that more than 19 million Chinese left their regions of origin to settle in Southeast Asia and the lands around the Indian Ocean and South Pacific. A central nodal point was the Straits Settlements, from which many traveled on to the Dutch Indies, Borneo, Burma, and places farther west. A second trajectory of Chinese mobility brought more than 30 million migrants to Manchuria and Siberia, a process that was facilitated by active homesteading policies by the Qing government and railroad construction since the 1890s.<sup>8</sup>

On a comparatively smaller scale, albeit of particular importance for the argument made here, were the contracts that migrants signed with European employers in the context of the so-called “coolie trade.” It is important to note, as Wang Gungwu has argued extensively, that coolie migration in many

and processes allowed social actors to link up with global contexts. These contexts did not create nationalism, but they influenced—and in some cases fundamentally shifted—the ways in which the nation was conceived and its mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion were practiced.

The effect of the increases in global mobility on discourses of nationalism can be observed, as has become evident in our discussion of Chinese migration, on at least three levels. One the one hand, many countries strengthened their immigration controls and devised ways to enforce control over the mobility of people, including passports, finger-prints, and other biometrical devices. The Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States is the best known example of a practice that most countries found increasingly difficult to ignore. Second, Chinese mobility contributed to the ethnicization of notions of national belonging, even if ethnic and racial criteria had a longer prehistory in most countries. The American Dillingham Report, the warnings of the Yellow Peril and the founding myth of a White Australia all were examples of this tendency. Finally, migration was an important factor working toward situating the nation in a systemic and global context, as the case of Chinese nationalism since the Sino-Japanese war clearly illustrates.

It appears, then, that global mobility, transnationalism, and nationalism were dynamically related to each other within a fluid global setting of migration and transfer. Mass migration influenced and defined a sense of nation for the host country and for the country of origin. The nationalizing effects were not at all homogenous. The political, economic, demographic, and cultural peculiarities of each context translated into very different constellations and nation-formation. However, in all cases, the sense of nation emerged at least partly in response to global currents. The existence of Chinese communities prompted questions concerning the cohesion and composition of the nation and fed into discourses of nationalism. In many countries, the trajectories of nationalism were significantly altered and acquired sharpness and profile in transnational contexts.

What is at issue here, then, is a revision of common assumptions concerning the history of nationalism. While an earlier trust in the long traditions and continuities of a national "essence" has long been deconstructed, most current theories of nationalism nevertheless privilege the temporal dimension of modern "imagined communities." While it is recognized that most national genealogies were indeed constructed in retrospect, the analytical focus remains on the connections of past, present, and future conceptualized strictly within national borders. However, our examples have shown that the particular form that nationalism and the representation of the nation-state took around the year 1900, were not mere invented traditions, but rather at least partly the effects of interactions and entanglements on a global scale.

The shifts and changes in the discourse of nationalism thus appear not only as effects of internal and diachronic modernization, as the familiar picture would suggest, but just as much of synchronous processes we retrospectively call globalization.

### Notes

1. Anthony G. Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002); C.A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, *Geschichte der Globalisierung: Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen* (München: Beck, 2003).
2. See T.N. Harper, "Empire, Diaspora and the Languages of Globalism, 1850–1914," in Hopkins, ed., *Globalization in World History* (London: Pimlico, 2002), pp. 141–66.
3. Bayly, *Birth*.
4. See *ibid.*, pp. 199–243. See also Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times* (London: Verso, 1994), pp. 47–58.
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9. See Wang Gungwu, "Patterns of Chinese Migration in Historical Perspective," in Wang Gungwu, *China and the Chinese Overseas* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), pp. 3–22.
10. See Gungwu, "Patterns," and Dominic Sachsenmaier, "Die Identitäten der Überseechinesen in Südostasien im 20. Jahrhundert," in Hartmut Kaelble, Martin Kirsch, Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, eds., *Transnationale Öffentlichkeit und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt: Campus, 2002), pp. 211–35.
11. See Ching-Hwang Yen, *Coolies and Mandarins: China's Protection of Overseas Chinese during the Late Ch'ing Period (1851–1911)* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), pp. 46–47.

# The French Imperial Nation-State



NEGRITUDE & COLONIAL HUMANISM  
BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

*Gary Wilder*

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Panafrican public produced by and through a historically specific network of individuals and institutions.

### The Negritude Cohort

Never a formal organization, Negritude was a cultural project that emerged through intense discussions and intimate friendships among a diasporic peer group whose members shared similar colonial backgrounds and metropolitan challenges, as well as an interest in Africa.<sup>2</sup> Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, and Léon-Gontran Damas were all products of colonial assimilation. Before leaving home to join the transnational group of colonial students and activists living in continental France in the 1930s, they were trained in overseas French schools to become members of the native elite in their home colonies. Senghor was born a Catholic colonial subject in 1906 and grew up in the Sine-Saloum region of rural Senegal. His father was a successful merchant and property owner involved in peanut exports.<sup>3</sup> Césaire, born in 1913, grew up in Basse-Pointe, Martinique, where his father was a government functionary who read French classics around the dinner table. His mother was a seamstress. Césaire's grandfather had been a schoolteacher who traveled to France.<sup>4</sup> Damas, whose father was a public works employee, was raised in an assimilated bourgeois household by his father's cousin, after his mother died in 1913, the year after he was born in Cayenne, Guiana.<sup>5</sup>

French education was an important element of each of their early biographies. Senghor remembers being removed abruptly from what he subsequently idealized as a rural African "kingdom of childhood," when he was seven. That year, 1913, his father sent him to live at the Catholic mission in Jaol. There he learned French and studied catechism before beginning primary school at the mission in neighboring Ngasobil, where he decided to become a priest and a professor. In 1923 he entered *collège* at the French and mostly white Libermann Seminary in Dakar. Here Senghor reports first confronting doctrines of African cultural inferiority. He remembers countering such racism with his own childhood memories of "a veritable, even beautiful" African civilization. Senghor resolved then that "the best way to prove the value of black culture was to steal the colonizers' own weapons and be an even better student."<sup>6</sup> He believed that teachers at the school blocked his future as a seminarian because he served as a spokesperson for student grievances. Senghor was redirected to a French secondary school in Dakar in 1926, where he received his *baccalauréat* in philosophy. That year he won every academic prize available, including one for

Damas, Senghor, and Césaire were especially influenced by the writings of Leo Frobenius, a contemporary German ethnologist whose work valorizing the history of African civilization and affirming the culturally integrated character of African societies paralleled the writings of Delafosse and Labouret. After reading a review of Frobenius's *History of African Civilization*, Césaire bought a copy in 1936, which he then passed on to Senghor.<sup>52</sup> Senghor would later write that "Frobenius was like a sudden burst of thunder! . . . It is Leo Frobenius, more than anyone else, who clarified for us words such as emotion, art, myth, Eurafrika."<sup>53</sup> This student cohort was thus directly connected to colonial ethnology and to colonial humanism.

Negritude in the 1930s was not a self-consciously organized movement. It consisted primarily of "interminable discussions" among students who shared ideas, explored Paris, and began to write poetry.<sup>54</sup> They engaged contemporary currents of colonial thought, French culture, and black politics in order to fashion relationships to the colonial system in which they had been trained, to the French nation in which they now lived, and to the African societies to which they felt deeply connected.<sup>55</sup> Damas confesses "we did not have the slightest idea that our student preoccupations would give birth to what we now call the Negritude movement."<sup>56</sup> He characterizes Negritude as "a spontaneous project . . . the reaction of a given category of individuals, in a given milieu, at a given moment in history."<sup>57</sup>

Over the course of their public lives, these "founders" would each develop different conceptions of racial consciousness and cultural nationalism, but they agree that at its inception Negritude was a rejection of assimilation, an identification with blackness, and a celebration of African civilization. Damas describes their commitment "to rehabilitate the black race . . . denounce the colonial system . . . and liquidate color prejudice."<sup>58</sup> Césaire explains Negritude as "a resistance to the politics of assimilation . . . a struggle against alienation. . . . we asserted that our Negro heritage was worthy of respect."<sup>59</sup> Senghor too emphasized their early focus on negation: "In the 1930s everything that was white . . . was rejected by us in the name of Negritude," including "discursive reason, Christian morality . . . 'scientific socialism,' and white women."<sup>60</sup>

In this chapter and the two that follow, I complicate this retrospective, one-sided construction of Negritude as a nativism. To this end, I first examine the ways in which already established colonized critics framed their relationship to republican politics, the national community, and their African heritage. Despite their heterogeneity, these often competing groups all performed and reflected on their anomalous status within French political culture. Whether explicitly or

.....  
GANDHI

David Arnold



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## PREFACE

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, India's 'Great Soul' or Mahatma, has been one of the most written-about individuals in modern history. Since his South African friend, the Reverend Joseph Doke, wrote the first life of Gandhi in 1909, when he was only forty years old, there have been more than four hundred biographies of Gandhi and an almost countless number of studies of different aspects of his political, religious, social and economic ideas. This book, however, is not intended to be a standard biography, nor, primarily, does it attempt to provide a guide to Gandhi's religious ideas or his moral and political philosophy. Its aims are twofold. Firstly, it seeks to situate Gandhi in the context of his own times and thus to assess his place in the history of India and the modern world. Secondly, it seeks to use the growing, and in many respects increasingly critical, literature about Gandhi to examine anew the nature of his often unconventional and controversial 'power'. Did he derive his power from his role as a nationalist leader and his unswerving commitment to India's struggle for freedom from British colonial rule? Or was it rather from the force and originality of his political ideas, his advocacy of non-violent action, and his pioneering techniques of non-violent resistance and mass civil disobedience – all of which had an appeal far beyond the shores of India? Was his power perhaps derived less from his ideological stance than from his political astuteness and pragmatism, or from his remarkable willingness, even in old age, to embark on new 'experiments with truth'? Was his power a consequence of his singular energy and his exceptional organisational skills, or, less determinately, from an inner saintliness, from personal charm and charisma? With Gandhi there are no simple answers, but these are the underlying issues that this book seeks to address and to answer.

## INTRODUCTION: THE IDEA OF GANDHI

Second only to the saintly image of Gandhi is his reputation as the 'father' or 'maker' of modern India. Such an idea was common during the later stages of the Indian nationalist movement and has been widely held in India and elsewhere since Independence. Jawaharlal Nehru was one of those who, despite his own personal and political differences with Gandhi, did much to promote this idea, but it has been taken up by many Western writers, historians and journalists as well. Such an idea rests on Gandhi's perceived centrality and dominant role in the anti-colonial struggle from 1919 onwards, the unique style of his leadership and especially the manner in which he was seen to give the nationalist movement a mass (essentially peasant) base, and the attribution of India's independence to the several non-violent civil disobedience (satyagraha) campaigns that Gandhi led against British rule between 1919 and 1942. Perhaps even more than his political leadership, Gandhi's wide-ranging programme of social reform might be said to have stamped an indelible mark on modern India. His campaigns against untouchability, his pursuit of gender equality, his efforts to revitalise India's villages and encourage hand-spinning, his opposition to the coercive power of the state – in these, as in many other respects, Gandhi would seem to have set the social and economic agenda for India for decades to come.

And yet here, too, Gandhi's reputation seems increasingly in jeopardy. Not all Gandhi's ideas and activities are now seen to have promoted national unity or to have advanced the cause of national independence. Other political leaders, reformers and intellectuals have been seen as having a clearer and worthier vision of what modern India might be. Nehru, for instance, with his ideal of a modern state and secular society, in which the benefits of science, technology and education were to be available to all, might equally be regarded as a 'maker of modern India'. Recent historical scholarship has also raised considerable doubts about some of the more sweeping claims for Gandhi's foundational role and inspiring leadership. We now know much more about the peasant and other popular struggles that preceded Gandhi's 'rise to power' and can see how Gandhi was able to latch onto existing movements and grievances rather than mobilising a hitherto inert peasantry almost single-handedly. It can be argued that peasants had good reasons of their own for being attracted to Gandhi, making him a mahatma in their own image and attributing to him ideas and aspirations that were close to their outlook and experiences but far removed from his own